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Abstract:  
Quantum mechanics emerged as the result of a successful resolution of stringent empirical and profound 
conceptual conflicts within the development of atomic physics at the beginning of the last century.  At first 
glance, it seems to be bizarre and even ridiculous to apply ideas of quantum physics in order to improve 
current psychological and linguistic or semantic ideas.  However, a closer look shows that there are some 
parallels in the development of quantum physics and advanced theories of cognitive science dealing with 
concepts, conceptual composition, vagueness, and prototypicality. In both cases of the historical 
development, the underlying basic ideas are of geometric nature. In psychology, geometric models of 
meaning have a long tradition. However, they suffer from many shortcomings which are illustrated by 
discussing several puzzles of bounded rationality.  The main suggestion of the present approach is that 
geometric models of meaning can be improved by borrowing basic concepts from (von Neumann) quantum 
theory.  
In the first part of this article, we consider several puzzles of bounded rationality. These include the 
Allais- and Ellsberg paradox, the disjunction effect, the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, and question 
order effects. We argue that the present account of quantum cognition – taking quantum probabilities 
rather than classical probabilities – can give a more systematic description of these puzzles than the 
alternate and rather eclectic treatments in the traditional framework of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, 
the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always and does not automatically provide a deeper 
understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. One reason is that quantum approaches introduce 
additional parameters which possibly can be fitted to empirical data but which do not necessarily explain 
them. Hence, the phenomenological research has to be augmented by responding to deeper foundational 
issues.   
In the second part of this article, we aim to illustrate how recent progress in the foundation of 
quantum theory can help to answer the foundational questions of quantum cognition.  This includes the 
opportunity of interpreting the free parameters, which are pure stipulations in the quantum probabilistic 
framework. Making a careful distinction between foundational and phenomenological research programs, 
we explain the foundational issue from the perspective of Piron, Foulis, Randall, and others, and we apply it 
to the foundation of quantum cognition. In this connection, we show that quantum probabilities are of 
(virtual) conceptual necessity if grounded in an abstract algebraic framework of orthomodular lattices. This 
framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras (describing particular perspectives) that are 
combined into a uniform system while considering certain capacity restrictions. It is at this point that one 
important aspect of the whole idea of bounded rationality directly enters the theoretical scenery of 
quantum cognition: resource limitation.  Another important aspect of the foundational issue is that it 
automatically leads to a distinction between probabilities that are defined by pure states and probabilities 
arising from the statistical mixture of such states. It is possible to relate this formal distinction to the deep 
conceptual distinction between risk and ignorance. A third outcome is the possibility to identify quantum 
aspects in dynamic macro-systems using the framework of symbolic dynamics, closely related to the 
operational perspective of Piron, Foulis, Randall, and others. This helps to understand the ideas of epistemic 
complementarity and entanglement, and to analyse quantum aspects in third generation neural networks.   
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1. Introduction 
In a series of recent papers, quantum probabilities are discussed as providing an alternative to 
classical probability for understanding cognition (e.g., Aerts 2009; Aerts et al. 2005; Blutner 2009; 
Blutner et al. 2013; Bruza et al. 2009; Busemeyer and Bruza 2012; Busemeyer et al. 2006; Conte et al. 
2008; beim Graben 2004; Gabora and Aerts 2002; Kitto 2008; beim Graben 2014). In considerable 
detail, they point out several cognitive phenomena of perception, decision and reasoning that cannot 
be explained on the basis of classical probability theory, and they demonstrate how quantum 
probabilities can account for these phenomena. An obvious way to downplay this chain of arguments 
is by demonstrating that besides classical probability and quantum probability models, alternative 
approaches are possible that could also describe the phenomena under study without using the 
strange and demanding instruments of quantum probability. This often happens in the scientific 
context of bounded rationality where alternative proposals are developed.  For instance, one could 
argue that the so-called conjunction puzzle can be resolved by simple heuristics (Gigerenzer 1997), 
and the well-known question ordering effects by query theory (Johnson et al. 2007). 
A general strategy to encounter such criticism is to look for a universal motivation of quantum 
probabilities which is based on fundamental (architectural) properties of the area under 
investigation. As Kuhn (1996) clarified, such basic assumptions constituting a theoretical paradigm 
normally cannot be justified empirically. Basic assumptions which concern the general architecture of 
the theoretical system are referred to as design features. Using a term that is common in the 
generative linguistic literature (Chomsky 1995, 2005), we shall call properties that are consequences 
of such design features as applying with (virtual) conceptual necessity. Hence, a central aim of this 
article is to demonstrate the conceptual necessity of the basic formalism of quantum mechanics for 
modelling concepts and their combination (including a description of vagueness and typicality). 
In the present literature, there are several approaches that seek for a general justification of 
quantum probabilities in the context of cognitive science.  For example, Kitto (2008) considers very 
complex systems such as the growth and evolution of natural languages and other cultural systems 
and argues that the description of such systems cannot be separated from their context of 
interaction. She argues that quantum interaction formalisms provide a natural model of these 
systems “because a mechanism for dealing with such contextual dependency is inbuilt into the 
quantum formalism itself” (Kitto 2008: p. 12). Hence, the question of why quantum interaction is 
necessary in modelling cognitive phenomena is answered by referring to its nature as a complex 
epistemic system. A related approach is taken by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014a, 2014b). These 
authors model the situation typical for measurements in cognitive science and argue that the 
observer’s lack of information relates to uniform and non-uniform fluctuations generated on the 
measurement situation. The emergence of quantum probabilities can be handled then by a first-
order approximation of a more general non-uniform quantum approach. 
In their recent book, Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), give several arguments why quantum models 
are necessary for cognition. Some arguments relate to the cognitive mechanism of judgments. 
Judgments normally do not take place in definite situations. Rather, judgments create the context 
where they take place. This is the dynamic aspect of judgments also found in dynamic models of 
meaning (beim Graben 2014). Another is the logical aspect. The logic of judgments does not obey 
classical logic. Rather, the underlying logic is very strange with asymmetric conjunction and 
disjunction operations. When it comes to considering probabilities and conditioned probabilities the 
principle of unicity is violated, i.e. it is impossible to assume a single sample space with a fixed 
probability distribution for judging all possible events.  Other arguments relate to the problem of 
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compositionality in cognitive semantics (Blutner et al. 2003; Blutner et al. 2004; de Hoop et al. 2007; 
Spenader and Blutner 2007). In Sections 2 - 4 we will discuss some of these arguments.  
Another line of argumentation seeks to answer the question of “why quantum models of 
cognition” by speculating about implications for brain neurophysiology. In the taken algebraic 
approach, even classical dynamical systems such as neural networks, could exhibit quantum-like 
properties in the case of coarse-graining measurements, when testing a property cannot distinguish 
between epistemically equivalent states (beim Graben 2004). Beim Graben & Atmanspacher (2009) 
used this “epistemic quantization” for proving the possibility of incompatible properties in classical 
dynamical systems. In neuroscience, most measurements, such as electroencephalography or 
magnetic resonance imaging, are coarse-grainings in this sense. Thus, the quantum approach to 
cognition has direct implications for brain neurophysiology, without needing to refer to a “quantum 
brain”,  as recently indicated by Pothos & Busemeyer (2013). A novel application of this idea using 
Hebbian neurodynamics as an underlying classical system to describe emerging properties that 
exhibit quantum-like traits is given by Acacio de Barros and Suppes (2009), Large (2010), and by 
others. 
As far as we can see, none of the foundational programs of grounding quantum cognition 
explicitly refers to the logical programs of theoretical physics that aim to ground all physical 
processes using the perspective of “operational realism”. In the following, we will come with a new 
proposal of answering the why question of quantum cognition, one that is based on operational 
realism. Mainly the program developed by the “Geneva school” (Jauch 1968; Piron 1972, 1976) is of 
special interest here:   
 
According to these authors, a “rational” reconstruction of Quantum Mechanics should be stated 
in terms of the actual operational meaning of the fundamental quantum mechanical concepts 
and principles, i.e. in terms of outcomes of possible experiments (“answers” to “questions”) that 
could in principle be performed on a given physical system. This approach might be called 
“operational-realist”, to distinguish it from the “pure” operationalism of neo-positivists and 
instrumentalists (Baltag and Smets 2011: p. 285) 
 
The basic idea of the Geneva school (borrowed from Mackey 1963) is to find a general and abstract 
formulation of quantum mechanics without explicitly starting from the structures of a Hilbert space. 
Instead, the idea is to justify the use of Hilbert space via a representation theorem (for the historical 
details, see Smets 2011). Further research by Foulis, Randall and colleagues (Foulis et al. 1983; Foulis 
and Randall 1972; Randall and Foulis 1973; Foulis 1999) substantiates this point. 
Summarizing, the present article makes a careful distinction between phenomenological 
research and foundational research. In the first part of this article (Sections 2-4) we consider several 
puzzles of bounded rationality, and we argue that the present account of quantum cognition – taking 
quantum probabilities rather than classical probabilities – does not automatically provide a deeper 
understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. The reason is that the quantum idea 
introduces several new parameters which possibly can be fitted to empirical data but which do not 
necessarily explain them. Hence, the phenomenological research has to be augmented by responding 
to deeper foundational issues.  In the second part (Sections 5-7) of this article, we aim to illustrate 
how present progress in the foundation of quantum theory can help to answer the foundational 
questions of quantum cognition.  This includes the opportunity of interpreting the free parameters 
which are pure stipulations in the quantum probabilistic framework. 
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Here is a more detailed outline of this article.  In Section 2, we will review the basic idea of 
bounded rationality in cognitive science and we will outline prospect theory as a basic approach that 
makes use of this idea. Further, we make clear why most of this work can best be characterized as 
“phenomenological research”, i.e. research that is related to the precise description of different 
phenomena without claiming a general, explanatory value. Section 3 introduces a broader series of 
puzzles that are discussed in the context of bounded rationality and argues that prospect theory and 
its follow-ups are of limited value only when it comes to ask for explanatory solutions.  Section 4 
introduces quantum probability as a new way to handle the puzzles and discusses the important role 
of interference effects. Unfortunately, we will see that within this field one and the same problem is 
often handled in different ways. In addition, the explanatory value of particular treatments is not 
always convincing. For that reason, it is essential to ask the foundational question, as done in the 
second part. This part starts with Section 5, which explains the basic distinction between 
foundational and phenomenological research programs.  Further, this section makes a historical note 
about the uncertainty principle and it illustrates that there are many interpretations of 
complementarity in the historical context. It also argues for an epistemic interpretation of 
complementarity in quantum cognition. In Section 6, we explain the foundational issue from the 
operational perspective of Piron, Foulis, and Randall, and give a closely related formulation in terms 
of symbolic dynamics. Further, we relate bounded rationality with resource limitations and consider 
a particular application of the ideas developed so far to research in speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
Finally, in Section 7 we discuss some empirical consequences of the present foundational perspective 
and we draw some general conclusions.  
2. Bounded rationality and cognitive science 
Early models of cognitive science are based on general ideas of rationality as developed in logic, 
probability theory and decision theory. For example, researchers of cognitive science have borrowed 
the idea of rational decisions from mathematical economics and game theory (e.g., Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1944; Savage 1954).  The classical idea is to assume (i) that rational agents are 
expected utility maximizers (using the mathematical conception of expected utility based on a 
classical probability measure), and (ii) that they maximize their expected utility with respect to the 
underlying economic model. Attempts to overcome the theoretical shortcomings of the classical 
attempt have resulted in the development of the bounded rationality project, originally proposed by 
Herbert Simon (1955). Simon claimed that we have to replace the "global rationality of the economic 
man" with a kind of behaviour that is compatible with the boundedness of the human decision 
maker and the particular kinds of environments in which such organisms exist. Boundedly rational 
agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, 
storing, retrieving, transmitting) information. There is a number of dimensions along which 
"classical" models of rationality can be made more realistic without giving up rigorous formalization. 
A good example is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979): 
classical theory, the utility of an uncertain prospect is the sum of the utilities of the 
In the classical theory, the utility of an uncertain prospect is the sum of the utilities of the 
outcomes, each weighted by its probability. The empirical evidence reviewed above suggests 
two major modifications of this theory: 1) the carriers of value are gains and losses, not final 
assets; and 2) the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight, not by an additive 
probability. The weighting scheme used in the original version of prospect theory and in other 
models is a monotonic transformation of outcome probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
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Formally, the difference between the classical scheme and prospect theory is shown here:  
 
(1) a. U(f) = Σi pi⋅u(xi)  
b. U(f) = Σi γ(pi)⋅v(xi) 
 
In the classical scheme of utility theory (1a), prospects or gambles f = (x1, p1; …, xn, pn) are contracts 
that yield (monetary) outcome xi with probability pi (Σi pi  = 1). The utility u(xi) is a direct expression 
of the monetary outcome xi . The overall utility of a prospect f, denoted by U(f), is the expected utility 
of its outcomes xi.  
It is convenient, to illustrate a prototypic decision problem as pictured in Figure 1. Depending on 
the chosen utility function, the figure illustrates both the classical scheme and prospect theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Prototypic decision problem. An agent has to decide between two prospects, a 
and b, leading to payoffs x1(a) and x2(a) for prospect a and x1(b) and x2(b) for prospect b. 
In classical decision theory, prospect a is chosen over prospect b if the classical utility 
U(a) is bigger than the classical utility U(b). Note that sometimes more than two payoffs 
are possible for a given prospect. And in some special cases, where only one possibility is 
open, one payoff is present only for one of the given prospects.  
 
Prospect theory calculates the overall value of a prospect as shown in (1b). Hereby, the scale v 
assigns to each outcome xi a number which reflects the subjective value of that outcome utility1
 
. The 
second scale, γ, associates with each probability pi a decision weight γ(pi), which reflects the impact 
of pi on the over-all value of the prospect. Than transformation γ translates standard probabilities 
into numbers that do not represent a probability measure but still are normalized (i.e., γ(0)=0, 
γ(1)=1). The sum of γ (p) and γ (1-p) is typically less than unity. The function γ is a nonlinear function 
which is formed by reference points eliciting the nonlinear deformations:  
For probability, there are two natural reference points—certainty and impossibility—that 
correspond to the endpoints of the scale. Therefore, diminishing sensitivity implies that 
increasing the probability of winning a prize by .1 has more impact when it changes the 
probability of winning from .9 to 1.0 or from 0 to .1 than when it changes the probability from, 
                                                          
1 This is typically a exponential function of the outcome, and it takes reference points into account 
reflecting that losses hurt more than gains feel good − for instance by taking v(x) = x.65 for x ≥ 0 (gains) and v(x) 
= −(−x).75 for x ≤ 0 (losses) (Tversky & Shafir, 1992, p. 308) 
a b 
x1(a) 
x2(a) 
x1(b) 
x2(b) 
   choose 
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say, .3 to .4 or from .6 to .7. This gives rise to a weighting function that is concave near zero and 
convex near one. (Tversky & Fox, 1995, p. 748) 
 
A simple example should illustrate the difference between standard utility theory and prospect 
theory (cf. Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Which of the following prospects would you prefer? 
 
a: 50% chance to win 1,000, 50% chance to win nothing; i.e. a = (1000,.5; 0, .5).  
In this case U(a) = .5 u(1000) 
b: 450 for sure; i.e. b = (450,1.). In this case U(b) = u(450) 
 
In case of using classical utility theory, people should prefer prospect a over prospect b since in the 
first case the expected utility is higher. In other words, we expect u(1000)/u(450) > 2 assuming a 
linear function  for u.  Several forms of such questionnaires were constructed and in each case (with 
outcomes referring to Israeli currency) the majority of the people voted in the opposite way.   
In order to analyse why classical decision theory fails we have to consider two other prospects 
with the same outcomes but with different probabilities: 
 
c: 10% chance to win 1,000, 90% chance to win nothing; i.e. c = (1000,.1; 0, .9). In this case U(c) = 
.1 u(1000) 
d: 20% chance to win 450, 80 % chance to win nothing; i.e. d = (450, .2; 0, .8). In this case U(d) = 
.2 u(450) 
 
While in the former case, classical decision theory predicts that rational agents prefer b over a iff 
u(1000)/u(450) < 2, in the latter case the theory predicts that rational agents prefer d over c iff 
exactly the same condition holds (since the condition 0.2 u(450) > .1 u(1000) is equivalent to the 
former condition u(1000)/u(450) < 2). Interestingly, the majority of people who took place in 
corresponding experiments preferred c over d in the latter case. As a consequence, the classical 
utility function is not able to describe the empirical data even in case of using a nonlinear utility 
function v.  Hence, the assumed probabilities have to be corrected, by taking the function γ into 
account as stated in prospect theory. In order to account for the empirical data we have to state the 
following empirical condition: γ(1)/ γ(.5) > γ(.2)/ γ(.1). Taking the reference points 0 and 1 into 
account as argued above, it is plausible to assume that γ(1) = 1 and γ(.5) ≈ .5; hence, γ(1)/ γ(.5) ≈ 2. 
Further, because of the concavity of the γ-function near zero (effect of overweighting small 
probabilities) it is plausible that γ(.2)/ γ(.1) < 2 and the empirically required condition is satisfied.  
At this point it should be obvious how the framework of bounded rationality is put into action: 
People are assumed to evaluate their losses and gains and to judge their probabilities by assuming 
certain heuristics. The model is descriptive but not explanatory. It tries to model real life choices by 
introducing several heuristically motivated parameters that can be fitted with the empirical data. 
Looking at the huge literature of recent approaches to bounded rationality (e.g. Gigerenzer and 
Selten 2001) suggests an adaptive toolbox of different approaches and models to handle the list of 
phenomena headed under the same title. From an explanatory point of view such an approach is not 
really encouraging, and a more systematic approach would be highly welcome. Unfortunately, there 
is no consensus on the definition of bounded rationality or what the critical questions of the project 
are (Rubinstein 1998).  
The puzzle we have used to motivate prospect theory is called the Allais puzzle  (referring to an 
article by Allais 1953). In prospect theory, the puzzle is solved by using a single uniform function γ 
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that models the deformation of probabilities by certain reference points. However, there are many 
other puzzles where a similar solution by using such a uniform function γ is questionable. In the next 
section we describe some of these puzzles and make clear that a more systematic approach is 
desired – one that deals with the origin of probabilities in a cognitive context.  
Of course, we do not claim that all problems discussed within the framework of bounded 
rationality can be solved in a uniform way and each kind of heuristic component is obsolete.  
However, for a series of puzzles there seems to be a systematic and explanatory way to account for 
them – one that is quite different from the ideas underlying prospect theory and its follow-ups (e.g., 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992). The approach we are proposing is exploiting quantum principles 
following several recent proposals (Aerts 1982, 2009; Blutner 2009; Busemeyer and Bruza 2012; 
Conte 1983; Franco 2007a; Khrennikov 2010; Yukalov and Sornette 2010).  
3. More puzzles 
3.1 The Ellsberg puzzle 
In handling the Allais paradox it has been assumed that there are specified probabilities accessible to 
the decision maker. Prospect theory describes how these probabilities are deformed and a decision is 
made on the basis of (1b). However, in many real decision situations the probabilities are unknown 
and not specified in advance (in the case of ignorance). Ellsberg (1961) describes what can happen in 
such a situation. Assume a ball will be randomly sampled from an urn that contains red (R), green (G) 
and blue (B) balls and the actor can win a certain payoff if she correctly predicts the colour of the 
ball. The actor is told that the box contains 300 balls, exactly 100 of them are red and the remaining 
ones are green or blue but the exact proportion of green or blue balls is not known.  Consider a first 
pair of choices, between action R (voting for red) and G (voting for green). Most respondents chose 
R, possibly because they assume the probability that red will be taken is 1/3 but the probability for 
green is unknown (bounded only in the interval from 0 to 2/3). This example illuminates the 
distinction between a risky decision under uncertainty and a decision based on ignorance (cf. Russell 
and Norvig 1995). Consider now the alternative choice between 𝑅� (voting for green or blue) and ?̅? 
(voting for red or blue). For a similar reason, most respondents prefer 𝑅� over ?̅? in this case.  
It is easy to see that the pattern {R ≻ 𝐺,𝑅� ≻ ?̅? } is incompatible with classical expected utility 
theory. Assume a payoff is $X in case of choosing the correct colour and $0 in the other case. Then in 
classical utility R ≻ 𝐺 means P(R) ⋅ u($X) > P(G) ⋅ u($X), i.e. P(R) > P(G). On the other hand 𝑅� ≻ ?̅? 
means P(G∨B) ⋅ u($X) > P(R∨B) ⋅ u($X), i.e. P(G∨B) > P(R∨B). Assuming additivity of classical 
probabilities (for all possible events) we get P(G)+P(B) > P(R) + P(B), i.e. P(G) > P(R). The latter 
conflicts with the earlier assumption that P(R) > P(G).  
Tversky & Fox (1995) consider a modification of prospect theory in order to resolve the puzzle. 
Obviously, when the probabilities are unknown, we cannot describe decision weights as a simple 
transformation γ of the probability scale as in (1b). Instead, Tversky & Fox (1995) introduce a 
weighting function W operating directly on the algebra of events.  This weighting function realizes 
what is called a capacity in theories of reasoning with uncertainty (Halpern 2003). In short, it is a 
normalized function (assigning 0 to the impossible event and 1 to the certain event) that satisfies 
monotonicity: if A⊆B then W(A) ≤ W(B).  Capacities do not require additivity. I.e., the Kolmogorovian 
assumption that W(A∪B) = W(A)+W(B) for incompatible events A and B is normally violated.  
However, a condition called subadditivity is postulated for W: 
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(2) W(A)+W(B) ≤ W(A∪B) = for all incompatible events A and B.2
 
 
Using the function W instead of a deformed probability function, the new expression for the 
expected utility of a prospects for the events Ei with outcomes xi becomes  
 
(3) U(f) = Σi W(Ei)⋅v(xi) 
 
Then the scenario {R ≻ 𝐺,𝑅� ≻ ?̅? } is equivalent to the conditions {W(R) > W(G),  W(G∪B) > W(R∪B)}. 
If W is a subadditive capacity, then the latter condition can be satisfied. For instance, assume W(R) = 
1/3, W(G) = 0,  W(G∪B) = 2/3, and W(R∪B) = 1/3}.  Obviously, these stipulations satisfy the two 
inequalities. Further, it can be seen that these stipulations define a special case of a subadditive 
capacity which is called an inner measure (Halpern 2003).  
Of course, this account is not really explanatory since the corresponding assumptions are not 
motivated independently. Further, one may wonder how ignorance and proper uncertainty differ in 
principle and the answer is rather unclear. In Section 4, we will come back to this issue.  
 
3.2 The disjunction effect 
The disjunction effect (Tversky and Shafir 1992) occurs when conditioned decisions are considered. It 
is closely connected to violations of the ‘sure-thing principle’, one of the basic claims made by a 
(classically) rational theory of decision making. In decision making, this principle is just a 
psychological version of the law of total probability, which we will explain later. Let us assume that a 
decision maker prefers option B over option 𝐵 when knowing that event A occurs and also when 
knowing that event A does not occur. Then the ‘sure-thing principle’ claims that the decision maker 
should prefer B over 𝐵 when not knowing whether or not A occurs. If the decision maker refuses B 
(or prefers 𝐵), we have a violation of this principle.  
In everyday reasoning, human behaviour is not always consistent with the sure thing principle. 
For example, Tversky & Shafir (1992) reported that more students would purchase a non-refundable 
Hawaiian vacation if they were to know that they had passed or failed an important exam, compared 
to a situation where the exam outcome was unknown. Specifically, P(B|A) = 0.54,  P(B|𝐴) = 0.57, and 
P(B) = 0.32, where B stands for the event of purchasing a Hawaiian vacation, A for the event of 
passing the exam, 𝐴 for the event of not passing the exam, and P for the averaged judgments of 
probability. Disjunction fallacies are fairly common in behaviour (Busemeyer and Bruza 2012).  
Classical probability theory does not allow patterns such as {P(B/A) > ½,  P(B|𝐴) > ½ ,P(B) ≤ ½}. 
This is a simple consequence from the law of total probability that can be stated as follows:  
 
(4) P(B) = P(B|A)⋅P(A) + P(B|𝐴)⋅P(𝐴). 
 
If we assume that  P(B|A) > ½ and  P(B|𝐴) > ½, then we get P(B) > ½  as a consequence. This conflicts 
with the assumption P(B) ≤ ½ comprising the disjunction fallacy.  
It is helpful to examine how the law (4) of total probability arises. We require three 
assumptions. First, we assume that the underlying algebra of events is Boolean. That means 
essentially, that we have distributivity. In the present case, distributivity allows us to derive 
                                                          
2 The same is required for the dual of W defined by the function W ’(A) = 1- W(𝐴). 
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B=BA∪B𝐴. Second, we assume that probability is an additive measure function. In particular, we 
have P(B)=P(BA)+P(B𝐴) for the two disjoint conjunctive events BA and B𝐴. Third, the standard 
definition of conditional probability allows us to write:  
 
(5) P(X|Y) = P(XY)/P(Y) 
 
The above three assumptions readily derive the law of total probability and explain the classical 
requirement that there is no disjunction effect, i.e. the difference P(B) – (P(B|A)⋅P(A) + P(B|𝐴)⋅P(𝐴)) 
is always required to be zero.  
Unfortunately, prospect theory or its modifications based on the general conception of 
subadditive capacities is not sufficient to explain the disjunction effect. The reason is that capacities 
are still based on the idea of a (partial) Boolean algebra and the law of subadditivity is valid within 
this framework, taking the following form: 
 
(6) W(B∩A)+W(B∩𝐴) ≤ W(B) 
 
Using the corresponding modification of (5) for the conditioned weight function W(B|A) =def 
W(B∩A)/W(A), it is not difficult to derive min{W(B|A), W(B|𝐴)} ≤ W(B). Hence, scenarios such as 
{W(B|A) = 0.54, W(B|𝐴) = 0.57, W(B) = 0.32} as in the Hawaiian vacation example are theoretically 
excluded.  
 The original explanation Tversky & Shafir (1992) gave for the disjunction effect referred to a 
psychologically plausible intuition, which corresponds to a failure of plausible reasoning under the 
unknown condition: 
 
We attribute this pattern of preference to the loss of acuity induced by the presence of 
uncertainty. Once the out-come of the exam is known, the student has good- albeit different -
reasons for taking the trip: If the student has passed the exam, the vacation is presumably seen 
as a reward following a successful semester; if the student has failed the exam, the vacation 
becomes a consolation and time to recuperate before taking the exam again. A student who does 
not know the outcome of the exam, however, has less clear reasons for going to Hawaii. In 
particular, she may feel certain about wanting to go if she passes the exam, but unsure about 
whether she would want to go if she fails. Furthermore, she may feel it is inappropriate to reward 
herself with a trip to Hawaii regardless of whether she passes or fails. Only when she focuses 
exclusively on the possibility of passing and of failing the exam does her preference for going to 
Hawaii become clear. The presence of uncertainty, we suggest, tends to blur the picture and 
makes it harder for people to see through the implications of each outcome. Broadening the 
focus of attention can lead to a loss of acuity. (Tversky & Shafir, 1992, p. 306) 
 
Busemeyer and Bruza (2012, p. 267) note that this psychological explanation is quite consistent with 
an approach based on interference:  
 
If choice is based on reasons, then the unknown condition has two good reasons. Somehow 
these two good reasons cancel out to produce no reason at all! This is analogous to wave 
interference where two waves meet with one wave rising while the other wave is falling so they 
cancel out. This analogy generates an interest in exploring quantum models. (Busemeyer & 
Bruza, 2012, p. 267). 
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In Section 4, we will develop this idea in considerable mathematical detail. 
 
3.3 The conjunction fallacy 
The conjunction fallacy was described first by Tversky & Kahneman (1983) and then verified by 
numerous authors (cf. Busemeyer and Bruza 2012). In one of their experiments subjects are 
presented with a story such as the following one:  
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, 
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in 
anti-nuclear demonstrations. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 298) 
 
After the presentation of the story the subjects are asked to assess the probabilities of several 
propositions on a numbered scale. We represent the critical propositions only (together with the 
averaged judgements of the probabilities):   
 
(7) (A)   Linda is active in the feminist movement     (0.61) 
(B)  Linda is a bank teller.      (0.38) 
(A&B)  Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement  (0.51) 
 
Obviously, the results contradict the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory: The conjunction of 
two propositions can never get a higher probability than each of the two conjuncts. Closely related 
results were obtained when asking for ranking the probabilities of the different events or when 
asking for frequency judgments (cf. the discussion in Busemeyer and Bruza 2012).   
Unfortunately, the conjunction fallacy cannot be explained by using any of the theoretical ideas 
discussed before. Prospect theory accounts for the fact that small probabilities are overweighted and 
large probabilities are underweighted in decision making. That does not help in the present case 
since the conjunction fallacy appears both with large and small probabilities. The idea of generalizing 
standard probabilities to capacities, which was helpful in case of resolving the Ellsberg puzzle, is not 
successful in the present case either. Capacities satisfy the condition of monotonicity, and 
monotonicity is violated if we consider the conjunction fallacy: A&B ⊆ B, but we do not have P(A&B) 
≤ P(B). Hence, it needs a new heuristic idea in order to resolve the fallacy. 
Tversky & Kahneman (1983) propose the judgmental heuristic of representativeness.  
Representativeness refers to estimating the probability of a situation or event by judging how similar 
it is to a coherent situation or prototype. As noted by Tversky & Kahneman (1983, p. 299) 
“representativeness depends on both common and distinctive features (Tversky, 1977), it should be 
enhanced by the addition of shared features.” In the case of the Linda example sketched in (7), A&B 
is more representative for Linda’s activities than A or B considered in isolation. Contrary to the 
standard extensional logic, this makes A&B more probable than its constituents.   
Unfortunately, there is no formal outline of a theory of representativeness within the context of 
judgmental heuristic. In the next section we will outline such a theory within the framework of 
quantum cognition.3
 
 
                                                          
3 A closely related phenomenon is the disjunction fallacy illustrated by examples such as “Linda is neither 
a bank teller nor a feminist” (see Busemeyer and Bruza 2012, p. 126…). The reader should also be referred to 
the work of Hampton (1988b, 1988a, 2007) investigating related phenomena in the conceptual domain.  
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3.4 Order effects 
Survey researchers have demonstrated repeatedly that the same question often produces quite 
different answers, depending on the question context (for numerous survey examples, see Sudman 
and Bradburn 1982; Schuman and Presser 1981). To cite just one particularly well-documented 
example, a group of (North-American) subjects were asked whether "the United States should let 
Communist reporters come in here and send back to their papers the news as they see it?" The other 
group was asked whether "a Communist country like Russia should let American newspaper 
reporters come in and send back to their papers the news as they see it?" Support for free access for 
the Communist reporters varied sharply depending on whether that question preceded or followed 
the question on American reporters. The differences are quite dramatic: in a study of 1950, 36% 
accepted communist reporters when the communist question came first and 73% accepted them 
when the question came second. When the study was repeated in 1982, the numbers changed to 
55% vs. 75%. 
Schumann and Presser (1981) described two kinds of ordering effects, which they called 
‘consistency’ and ‘contrast’ effects. The example with the case of accepted communist reporters 
illustrates the consistency effect, where in the context of the other question the answer frequencies 
are assimilated. In the contrast case, the differences of the answer frequencies are enlarged. In a 
more recent article,  Moore (2002) reports on the identification of two different types of question-
order effects termed as ‘additive’ and ‘subtractive’.  The following figure gives a schematic sketch of 
the four different types of question ordering effects (adapted from Blutner 2012): 
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      Consistency                    Contrast             Additive          Subtractive  
 
Figure 2: Four types of order effects for attitude questions. The size of the blocks for the 
two questions indicates the percentage of ‘yes’-answers when the questions appear 
isolated. The arrows indicate whether the percentage of ‘yes’-answers to these 
questions increases or decreases if the question is preceded by the alternative question  
 
Question order effects are normally not considered in the context of bounded rationality. The reason 
is simply that the theoretical models that are standardly deliberated in order to describe the data − 
such as prospect theory − are actually not used for handling question-ordering effects. Instead, a 
completely different group of phenomenological models is applied to get insights into the nature of 
order effects. For instance, Weber and Johnson  (Weber and Johnson 2006, 2009; Johnson et al. 
2007; Johnson and Busemeyer 2010) have proposed that certain memory processes can be used to 
model such tasks:  
 
This approach, most recently dubbed ‘Query theory’, assumes that preferences that drive choice 
and other decisions are based on a collection of serially posed queries to memory concerning 
relevant characteristics of the task. For example, if deciding whether to buy a certain digital 
camera, an individual might attempt to recall experiences with similar models or generate the 
pros and cons of buying the camera. Query theory is able to explain some empirical trends in 
human decision behavior by embellishing this simple notion with what is known about human 
memory, such as serial position effects, priming, and interference. Although the theory’s 
assumptions have been empirically supported, at this point it has not been formally introduced 
as a mathematical model or at a specific algorithmic level, as the preceding computational 
models have.” (Johnson & Busemeyer 2010, p. 745).  
 
However, in the theoretical context of quantum models, the situation has changed radically and we 
will see that the existence of such order effects is constitutive for the appearance of the typical 
phenomena of bounded rationality. Hence, whether a given phenomenon is meaningfully grouped 
under a certain label, let it be the label of ‘bounded rationality’ or any other label, depends on the 
theoretical paradigm that aims to capture the phenomenon. It is not surprising that prospect theory 
and quantum cognition generate different groupings. Regarding ‘query theory’, we can add that it 
designates a system of informal ideas that possibly can be explicated and mathematized in the 
formalism of quantum cognition (rather than in terms of prospect theory). 
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4.  Quantum probabilities and the proper analysis of some 
puzzles of bounded rationality 
In the last section, we have introduced some puzzles of bounded rationality. We have shown how the 
Allais paradox can be resolved by prospect theory using a single uniform function γ that models the 
deformation of probabilities by certain reference points.  In contrast, for solving the Ellsberg puzzle a 
substantial modification of prospect theory was required introducing a novel weighting function. This 
function realizes what is called a capacity in formal theories of reasoning with uncertainty (Halpern 
2003). Importantly, the disjunction effect, by contrast, cannot be explained by this modification of 
prospect theory. Instead, a new idea is required based on the failure of plausible reasoning when the 
conditions are unknown. Yet another new idea, the concept of representativeness, is required to 
resolve the conjunction and disjunction fallacies. Some readers might have the impression that the 
field of judgmental heuristic is dominated by a rather eclectic methodology. We actually agree with 
this view. Interestingly, some authors suggest to making a virtue out of necessity. For instance, 
Gigerenzer & Selten (2001) proposed an “adaptive toolbox” to handle the problems. In our opinion, 
this conclusion is premature and questionable.4
In order to avoid misunderstandings, we do not disapprove the empirical findings of 
judgemental heuristics including the results of Gigerenzer and other representatives of the toolbox 
idea. Rather, we challenge the fruitfulness of those theoretical ideas for the foundation of cognitive 
science. In natural sciences, it is not a very attractive methodology to propose a toolbox of different 
theories in order to handle closely related empirical data. Instead, natural scientists try to explain the 
data on hand by means of deduction from a universal theory which is the end of their striving. We 
think this idea should apply also to psychology, linguistics and cognitive science in general.  In this 
section we suggest the formalism of quantum theory as a powerful research instrument that can 
provide uniform and systematic solutions. 
  
 
4.1 An elementary introduction to Hilbert space semantics 
One of the main arguments for a quantum approach to cognitive phenomena is the existence of 
interference effects in higher cognitive processes such as perception, decision making, and reasoning 
(Aerts 2009; Blutner 2009; Bruza et al. 2009; Busemeyer and Bruza 2012; Busemeyer et al. 2011; 
Conte 1983; Conte et al. 2008; Franco 2007a, 2007b; Khrennikov 2006; Pothos and Busemeyer 2009; 
Primas 2007). In quantum cognition, interference terms typically appear when considering the 
probability of composed events or propositions.  
After a concise introduction of the mathematics of Hilbert spaces, we will explain the basic 
concepts of quantum probability and the concept of measurement. It goes without saying that we 
can introduce the mathematical framework in a rather sketchy way here only. Readers who are 
interested in a deeper mathematical understanding are referred to the rich literature of (text-) books 
on quantum theory, quantum information, and quantum logic (e.g., Engesser et al. 2009; Pitowsky 
1989; Vedral 2006).  
                                                          
4 A forerunner of the toolbox idea is Werner Müller who proposed the project of ‘systematic heuristic’  
(Müller 1970).  This project was supported by Walter Ulbricht by a huge research institution (which was, 
unfortunately, eliminated by Erich Honecker shortly after the fall of Ulbricht).  
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In traditional theories of formal semantics (Lewis 1983; Montague 1970), the building blocks of 
the underlying ontology are possible worlds, i.e. unstructured objects without any intrinsic properties 
and without any relations to other objects. Propositions are considered as sets of possible worlds, 
and the algebra of propositions is a Boolean algebra (formed by the set-theoretic operations 
intersection, union, and complement).  In contrast, the ontology of quantum theory is based on 
vectors in a Hilbert space ℋ. Vectors are entities that can be added with other vectors and that can 
be multiplied with a scalar number.  For instance, multiplying a vector u ∈ ℋ by the number 1.5 
gives a new vector written 1.5 u (which is equivalent to the sum u+0.5 u). It should be noted that 
vectors can also be multiplied with complex numbers.  
Complex numbers are nothing else than pairs [a1, a2] of real numbers. The first part of a complex 
number is called its real part; the second part is called its imaginary part. Complex numbers are 
usually written in the form a = a1+ a2 i, with real numbers a1 and a2. For calculating with complex 
numbers the same rules are used as for calculating with real numbers, respecting the assumption i2 = 
−1. Complex numbers were introduced to allow for solutions of certain equations, such as z2+1 = 0, 
that have no real solution (since the square of z is 0 or positive, so z2 + 1 cannot be zero). It is easy to 
see that the equation has two complex solutions: z = ± i. Generalizing the result, in 1799 Gauss 
published the first proof that an nth degree algebraic equation has n roots each of the form a = a1 + 
a2 i, for some real numbers a1 and a2. 
Through the Euler formula, a complex number a = a1 + a2 i may be written in the form 
 
(8) a = |a| (cos θ + i sin θ) =  |a| eiθ, where |a| = 22
2
1 aa +  and )arctan( 1
2
a
a=θ , 
 
where |a| designates the absolute magnitude of the complex number and θ  is the angle between 
the abscissa and the vector from the origin pointing to the point  [a1, a2] in the two-dimensional 
geometric representation of the Gaussian number plane. Each complex number a = a1 + a2 i has a 
complex conjugate a* = a1  − a2 i. The product a a* equals |a|2  = a12 + a22 and provides the modulus 
of the complex number a.5
Another important Hilbert space operation is the scalar product. Scalar multiplication and scalar 
product are different operations. Whereas the former is an operation between (real or complex) 
numbers and vectors resulting in vectors; the latter is an operation between two vectors resulting in 
a (real or complex) number. It is intended to express the similarity of the two vectors. The scalar 
product of two vectors u, v in a given vector space is written in the form u⋅v. If the scalar product of 
two vectors is zero, the vectors are to be called ‘orthogonal’. The scalar product of a vector with itself 
defines the square of the ‘length’ of the vector: ||u||2 = u⋅u.
  
6
Vector spaces (denoted by U, V, …) are sets of vectors that are closed under the two operations 
of vector addition and scalar multiplication. In other words, if all the vectors ui (i= 1, …, n) are 
elements of a vector space, then each linear combination of them, i.e. each sum x1⋅u1 + x2⋅u2 + … + 
xn⋅un, is also an element of the vector space. Vector spaces based on scalar multiplication with real 
 
                                                          
5 The usefulness of complex numbers becomes evident when we consider vectors that represent 
oscillations (the appearance of waves at a certain point of space). Such oscillations can be represented by 
functions of time such as ei2π f t (where f is the frequency of the oscillation). The scalar multiplication of this 
‘vector’ with the complex number eiθ  results in a phase shift of the original oscillation: eiθ  ei2πf t = ei(2πf t + θ). 
6 Mathematically spoken, the scalar product is a sesquilinear form, i.e. an antilinear form in the first 
argument and a linear form in the second argument: au⋅bv = a*b u⋅v; (u + u’)⋅(v+v’) =  u⋅v + u’⋅v + u’⋅v + u’⋅v’. 
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numbers are called real vector spaces; vector spaces based on scalar multiplication with complex 
numbers are called complex vector spaces. 
A subset of a vector space U is called a subspace of U if it is a vector space in itself (i.e. closed 
under addition and scalar multiplication). Let U1 and U2 be two subspaces of U, then the sum of the 
two vector spaces, written U1 + U2 , is the set of all possible sums of elements of U1 and U2. The sum 
of two vector spaces is a vector space again. We will say that the sum U1 + U2 is a direct sum, written   
𝑈1 ⊕ 𝑈2, of the two subspaces U1 and U2 if and only if each element of the sum can be written 
uniquely as a sum u1 + u2 where u1∈U1 and u2∈U2. It can be proven (e.g. Axler 1996) that a sum U1 + 
U2 is a direct sum if and only if U1 ∩ U2 = {0}. The linear hull of a list of vectors (u1, u2 ,…, un) in U is 
defined as the set of all linear combinations of these vectors, denoted LH(u1, u2 ,…, un). A vector 
space is called finite-dimensional if it is the linear hull of some finite list of vectors. 
An important concept is linear independence of a set of vectors. A set of vectors is called linearly 
independent if none of its elements is a linear combination of the others. Otherwise it is called 
linearly dependent. A basis of a vector space U is a list of linearly independent vectors in U iff U is the 
linear hull of these vectors. If there are several bases of a vector space, it can be proven that the 
number of the vectors is the same in each base. This number is called the dimension of the vector 
space. Observe that dim(U1 + U2) = dim(U1) + dim(U2) − dim(U1 ∩ U2). This result allows the following 
conclusion: the dimension of the direct sum of two vector spaces is the sum of the dimensions of the 
two spaces. A basis of a vector space can consist of vectors which are pairwise orthogonal and each 
has unit length. Such a basis is called an orthonormal basis. Is it easy to show that the scalar product 
of two vectors is the sum of the products of their respective coefficients taken an orthonormal basis.  
Let us consider a subspace U of a Hilbert space ℋ. With the help of the scalar product the 
orthocomplement of U – written U⊥ – can be defined as the set of vectors that are orthogonal to 
each vector in U:  U⊥ = {u∈ℋ: u⋅v = 0 for any v∈U}. It is not difficult to prove that the 
orthocomplement is a vector space again and that ℋ is the direct sum of U and U⊥: ℋ = U ⊕ U⊥. 
The algebra that arises from considering the three basic operations on vector spaces, intersection, 
sum, and orthocomplement is called an orthomodular lattice and will be considered more closely in 
Section 6. At this moment it is sufficient to say that this algebra has properties similar to a Boolean 
algebra with the exception that the principle of distributivity is lacking. Considering all subspaces of a 
Hilbert space ℋ is useful then when it comes to look for alternatives to the classical conception of 
propositions (sets of possible worlds). 
Closely related to subspaces of a Hilbert space ℋ are so-called projection operators A. They 
project each vector of ℋ into a given subspace of ℋ.7 Formally, they can be represented by linear 
operators, i.e. operators that satisfy the condition F(au + bv) = a F(u) + b F(v) for any complex 
numbers a and b and any vectors u,v ∈ ℋ. They have to satisfy the special property of idempotence: 
AA=A. Equivalently, this can be expressed by the conditions that projection operators have 
eigenvalues 0 or 1.8
                                                          
7 That means, if we decompose any vector u into the direct sum 𝑢1 ⊕ 𝑢2, where u1 is in the given 
subspace and u2 in its orthocomplement, then A(u) = u1 . 
  In the quantum approach, propositions are modelled by projection operators. 
8 The eigenvectors of a linear operator F are the vectors u satisfying the equation F(u) = λ u for a 
(complex) number λ. This number is called an eigenvalue. Not all linear operators have eigenvectors. In the 
following we will consider so-called Hermitean operators. They are defined as operators which always have real 
eigenvalues. Alternatively, Hermitean operators can be defined by the condition that F* = F, where F* denotes 
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This is equivalent of modelling them by subspaces of ℋ. The subspace can be reconstructed as the 
positive eigenspace of A, i.e. the set of all vectors satisfying the eigenvalue equation A(u) = u. In 
combining projection operators, order can matter. That is, it can be that AB≠BA for two projection 
operators A and B.  Interestingly, if all projection operators relative to a given Hilbert space commute 
(i.e., AB=BA), then we get a Boolean algebra of projectors. The important conclusion is that the 
algebra of projection operators contains a Boolean algebra as a special case. 
 It is instructive to consider the two main differences between the treatment of classical 
propositions (sets of possible worlds) and quantum propositions (projections in Hilbert spaces). First, 
instead of union A∪B in the classical case, we consider the sum operation A+B in the quantum case 
(constructing the smallest subspace that contains the two subspaces corresponding to A and B.  The 
second difference refers to complementation. In the quantum case, a negated proposition refers to a 
subspace orthogonal to the original one. We will write 𝑨=I−𝑨 for the orthogonal projection operator9
Let us consider now the mathematical notion of probability. Even in the quantum case, a 
probability function is an additive measure function: P(A+B) = P(A) + P(B) assuming that the two 
considered projectors A and B  are orthogonal to each other. In both the classical and the quantum 
case, the second condition is normalization, assigning the value 1 to the weakest proposition and the 
value 0 to the strongest one: P(I) = 1 and P(∅) = 0.
 
(I is the identity operator mapping any vector to itself). It is easy to see that   𝑨𝑨 = 𝑨 𝑨 
=(I−A)A=IA−AA=A−A=0. 
10
 
 For each normalized vector u, it is possible to 
define a probability function in the following way: 
(9) Pu(A) =  ||A(u)||2 
 
This is the so-called Born-rule stating that the square of the length of the projection A(u) should be 
seen as probability for the proposition A, or, in a physical jargon, the probability that the state u 
collapses into the positive eigenspace of A (with eigenvalue 1). It is important to see that this 
probability function is defined by the geometry of the Hilbert space, especially the geometric 
features of the projector A and the (pure) state u. For that reason we will call the probability function 
Pu a structural or geometric probability. It contrasts with another notion of probability where a 
system of orthonormal vectors ui is given together with (statistical) weights pi (Σpi = 1) and the 
resulting statistical probability is calculated in the following way: 
 
(10)   P{𝑢𝑖,𝑝𝑖}(𝑨) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ P𝑢𝑖(𝑨) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the adjoint of F. Hereby the adjoint is defined by the following clause:  (Fv)⋅u = v⋅(F*u) for all vectors u, v ∈ ℋ. 
Projection operators are always Hermitean operators.  
9 Sometimes the symbol A⊥  is used for indicating the orthocomplement. Since, from the context, it is 
always clear whether orthocomplementation is meant or the usual set-theoretic complement, we will use the 
form 𝑨 in both cases.  
10 It should be stressed that we are using a subjective (or Bayesian) notion of probability in the present context. 
In this regards, it is essential that there is a decision theoretic foundation of the additive measure function both 
in the set theoretic case and in the case of considering the projection lattice of a Hilbert space. As shown in 
several papers by Fuchs and colleagues  (e.g., Barnum et al. 2000; Caves et al. 2002a), there is a standard Dutch 
book argument in both cases. The Dutch-book argument shows that, to avoid sure loss, an agent’s gambling 
commitments should obey the usual axioms establishing additive measure functions.  
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This statistical probability is relative to the (statistical) weights pi and can be seen as a weighted 
mixture of (structural) probabilities. John von Neumann has introduced so-called density matrices in 
order to express such mixed states in an elegant and uniform way (von Neumann 1932). However, 
for the present purpose it is sufficient to use the concept of mixture in an informal way.  
Next, we have to explain the idea of a physical measurement, where the observable being 
measured is represented by a Hermitian operator F. Assume that the considered physical system is in 
a certain state u∈ℋ. There are two possibilities now. First, the state u is an eigenstate of F, say with 
eigenvalue λ. Then measurement of F yields this eigenvalue and the state after measurement is not 
changed (i.e. it is u again). The second possibility is that the state u is not an eigenstate of F. In this 
case, quantum mechanics assumes that the act of measurement changes this state into another state 
which is always an eigenstate of F. However, the particular eigenstate out of several possible ones 
that becomes actualized is decided by chance. There is no way to formulate a deterministic 
mechanism for this decision. Hence, indeterminism is an essential component of quantum 
mechanics. The only thing that can be predicted is the probability of finding the output state in a 
certain eigenspace of F. For example, consider the space described by the projection operator Ai. The 
probability that the state u collapses to the eigenspace of Ai can be calculated by the Born-rule: Pu(Ai) 
=  ||Ai(u)||2. It yields the probability that the eigenvalue λi is measured.  
To repeat the deep insight from quantum theory: the act of measurement can change the state 
of the system. Only if the initial state is an eigenstate of the observable being measured the final 
state is not changed by the measurement. In all other cases, the initial state u is changed into a 
mixed state describing the possible outcomes of the measurement and their probabilities. Generally, 
a measurement can be seen as a question addressed to nature. The act of questioning can change 
the state of the system. This is not really surprising when considering modern versions of update 
semantics (Blutner 2012).  
If an exact outcome of the measurement cannot be calculated, what is the expectation value of 
measuring observable F when measurement takes place in a pure state u? Based on the intuitive idea 
of measurements, the scalar product between u and the outcome of applying the observable F to the 
state u can be used to calculate this expectation value. This is labelled by Fu. 
 
(11)  Fu = u ⋅ F(u) 
 
In case of projection operators, formula (11) gives the probability of the proposition expressed by the 
projector: Au = u ⋅ A(u) = u ⋅ A(A(u)) = A(u) ⋅ A(u) = ||A(u)||2 = Pu(A).  
Lüders (1951) has proposed a formula that refers to a sequence of two measurements A and 
then B. The corresponding operator we will abbreviate (A; B). According to Lüders the probability for 
such a sequence can be calculated as follows: 
 
(12)  Pu(A; B) =  ||B(A(u))||2 
 
Hence, the operator A is first applied to the state u, and then the operator B is applied to the 
resulting state and transforms it into a final state whose squared length determines the structural 
probability of the sequence.  
In order to determine the operator representing the sequence (𝑨;𝑩) we apply the Born rule (9) 
to the state 𝑣 = 𝑨(𝑢), i.e. P𝑣(𝑩) = ||𝑩(𝑣)||2 = 𝑩(𝑣) ⋅ 𝑩(𝑣) = 𝑩(𝑨(𝑢)) ⋅ 𝑩(𝑨(𝑢)) = 𝑩𝑨(𝑢) ⋅
𝑩𝑨(𝑢) = 𝑨(𝑢) ⋅ 𝑩𝑩𝑨(𝑢) = 𝑢 ⋅ 𝑨𝑩𝑨(𝑢). Therefore the following equation holds (Niestegge 2008): 
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(13)  (A; B) = ABA 
 
This sequence operator can be used to define conditionalized probabilities in the quantum case 
(Niestegge, 2008): 
 
(14)  P(B|A) = P(ABA)/P(A) . 
 
The operator (A; B) or ABA is called asymmetric conjunction. Note that P(ABA) = P(A and then B), 
which is how Busemeyer et al. (2011) modelled conjunction in human decision making (see also 
Blutner, 2009).11
 
 Note further that standard systems of quantum logic (Engesser et al. 2009) always 
use symmetric versions of conjunction and have deep intrinsic problems when it comes to consider 
non-commuting projections. One problem is that the resulting systems do not obey the deduction 
theorem which is constitutive for a proper logic in the opinion of many logicians. In the following, we 
will see that the notion of asymmetric conjunction is very useful when discussing certain puzzles of 
bounded rationality. 
4.2 The Allais puzzle 
In Section 2 we have considered four prospects a,b,c,d, representing pairs of one or two winning 
situations (to win 1000 units or to win 450 units) and one losing situation (to win nothing). In the 
classical case, we can represent the utilities as the diagonal elements of the following matrix: 
 
(15)       U = �
𝑢(1000) 0 00 𝑢(450) 00 0 0� 
 
The four prospects are then defined by the vectors 𝑎 =  �√. 5, 0,√. 5 �, 𝑏 =  (0, 1, 0 ), 𝑐 =
�√. 1, 0, √. 9 �, 𝑑 =  �0,√. 2, √. 8 �. The single components of these vectors give the square root of 
the probability of the corresponding situation. Let us call such vectors risk profiles. The expected 
utility of any risk profile x can then be calculated by the quadratic form:12
 
 
(16)  Ux = x ⋅ U xT 
 
It is easy to check that this formula gives exactly the results we found earlier for the expected utility 
in the classical model: Ua = .5 u(1000), Ub = u(450),  Uc = .1 u(1000), and Ud = .2 u(450). In this way, it 
is not possible to reproduce the experimentally expected results that prospect b is preferred to a 
while c is preferred to d.  For example, if we assume that u(1000) = 10 and u(450) = 5.5, then we get 
correctly that b is preferred to  a but wrongly that d is preferred to c.  
                                                          
11 For a different but related approach see Yukalov and Sornette (2010, 2013). 
12 In general, Fx = x ⋅ F x
Tcan be seen as matrix pendant to formula (11) expressing the expectation value in 
the abstract operator formalism. In the matrix calculations, the application operation corresponds to the 
product of a matrix with a (column) vector, and the scalar multiplication corresponds to the multiplication of a 
row vector with a column vector (resulting in the sum of the products of the corresponding component values).  
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La Mura’s idea of ‘projected expected utility’ (La Mura 2009) is to consider formula (16) as valid 
even when U is not a diagonal matrix but contains non-diagonal elements different from zero. For 
example, he suggests to assuming a slight aversion to the risk of obtaining no gain (third component 
of the vectors) such that we have to consider matrices as the following one:  
 
(17)  U = �
10 0 −10 5.5 −1
−1 −1 0 � 
 
Using formula (16) again now yields the following results: Ua = 4, Ub = 5.5,   Uc = .4, and Ud = .3. Hence, 
prospect b is preferred to a while c is preferred to d. 
 
4.3 The Ellsberg puzzle 
La Mura’s theory of ‘projected expected utility’ can be applied to resolving the Ellsberg puzzle as well 
(La Mura 2009). In Section 3.1 we have considered two prospects R and G assuming a payoff of $X in 
case of choosing the correct colour and $0 in the other case. Hence, instead of two winning 
situations as in the example discussed before, we are concerned with one winning situation only (to 
win $X) and one losing situation (zero-payoff). For simplicity, we assume that u($X ) = 1 and U($0 ) = 
0. Hence, we can model the scenario by assuming the following diagonal utility matrix: 
 
(18) U = �1 00 0� 
 
The two prospects R and G can modelled then by two risk profiles:  𝑟 =  ��1
3
, �2
3
 � and 𝑔 =
 �� 𝑗
300
, �300−𝑗
300
 �
0≤𝑗≤200
. In the latter case the risk profile contains a hidden parameter j ranging 
from 0 to 200 (the number of green balls the actor does not know). We will call such risk profiles 
mixed risk profiles. It is easy to calculate the expected utilities for both profiles: 
Ur = 1/3 and Ug = j/300. In the latter case we will assume that all possibilities for choosing j are 
equally mixed. In the average, then we get   mean Ug =
1
201
∑ ( 𝑗
300
)200𝑗=0  = 1/3. This is the classical 
solution, which does not make a difference between risk and ignorance. Consequently, both 
prospects are ranked equally.  
Again, we consider formula (16) as valid even when U is not a diagonal matrix but contains non-
diagonal elements different from zero. Following La Mura (2009), we consider the following 
Hermitean utility matrix containing a free parameter α (real number): 
 
(19) U = �1 α
α 0�. 
 
Again, we can calculate the expected utilities and obtain now: Ur = 1/3 + 0.94α and Ug = j/300 + 
2α�𝑗(300 − 𝑗)/300. Assuming again that all possibilities for choosing j are equally mixed, we get 
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mean Ug =
1
201
∑ (𝑗+2α�𝑗(300−𝑗)
300
)200𝑗=0  = 1/3+0.83α.13
Summarizing, the probability of risky events is calculated by the Born rule; the probability of 
events under ignorance is calculated by mixing. Quantum probabilities correspond to the normal 
case of judging risks. The case of ignorance (no explicit probabilities are provided by the geometry of 
projections) are handled by the mixed case of the density matrix (Franco 2007c).
 If α = 0, there is no difference in preference 
between the risky action R and the uncertain action (action of ignorance) G. If α > 0, then the risky 
action R is advantageous over the uncertain action G (and converse in the case of α < 0). Hence, the 
empirical data can be fitted by a positive parameter α determining the avoidance of situations of 
ignorance. 
14
 
  
4.4 The disjunction effect 
In Section 3.2 we have seen that classical probability theory cannot account for the disjunction effect. 
The reason was that in the classical theory we can derive the law of total probability (4), for 
convenience repeated here: 
 
(20)   P(B) = P(B|A)⋅P(A) + P(B|𝐴)⋅P(𝐴). 
 
Let us see now what happens with equation (20) in the quantum case. As mentioned above, also in 
the quantum case, a probability function is an additive measure function. However, instead of using 
sets of possible worlds to model propositions, the quantum approach models propositions by 
subspaces of a given Hilbert space, or projection operators that project any vector into the given 
subspace. In order to get the quantum version of equation (20), we can decompose the projector B in 
the following way:  
 
(21)  B=𝑰𝑩𝑰 = �𝑨 + 𝑨�𝑩�𝑨 + 𝑨� =ABA+𝑨B𝑨+𝑨𝑩𝑨 +𝑨𝑩𝑨 
 
The four parts of this decomposition are orthogonal to each other. Using the definition of 
asymmetric conjunction as given in equation (13), we get (22a); using in addition the definition of 
conditionalized probabilities − equation (14) −, we obtain (22b). 
 
(22)  a. P(B) =     P(A; B)     +   P(𝑨;𝑩)       + ∂(A,B), where ∂(A,B)=P(𝑨𝑩𝑨+𝑨𝑩𝑨) 
 b. P(B) = P(B/A) P(A) + P(B|𝑨) P(𝑨) + ∂(A,B),  
 
                                                          
13 Instead of considering the sum   1
201
∑ (𝑗+2α�𝑗(300−𝑗)
300
)200𝑗=0 , of course, it is possible to consider the definite 
integral 1
201
∫
𝑗+2α�𝑗(300−𝑗)
300
𝑑𝑗
200
0
.  Busemeyer and Bruza (2012, p. 260) who consider three possibilities only (all 
blue balls, all green balls, equal number of blue and green balls) gets a mean of 1/3+0.63α instead of 
1/3+0.83α, and La Mura (2009) who considers two possibilities only gets 1/3+0.47α. 
14 In standard treatments of reasoning with uncertainty, the difference between risk and uncertainty is 
treated by Dempster-Shafer theory  (Russell and Norvig 1995) In this theory, the introduction of ignorance 
leads to the specification of intervals. The bigger the span of the interval the bigger the degree of ignorance. A 
careful comparison between the Dempster-Shafer approach and the present account goes beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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The term ∂(A,B)  is called the interference term. It is zero if A and B commute, in which case equation 
(22b) reduces to (20) − the law of total probability.  
Equation (22b) allows to expressing the disjunction effect. In fact, the difference P(B) − 
(P(B|A)⋅P(A) + P(B|𝐴)⋅P(𝐴))  is the interference term ∂(A,B)=P(𝑨𝑩𝑨+𝑨𝑩𝑨). Hence, we get a 
numerical value for the disjunction effect when we calculate the interference term. In quantum 
theory, the probability function P is always relative to the state of the system, either mixed or pure. 
For simplicity, we consider pure states u only at the moment. In this case, we can calculate the 
following expression for the interference term:  
 
(23) Pu(𝑨𝑩𝑨+𝑨𝑩𝑨) = 2�P𝑢(𝑩|𝑨)P𝑢(𝑨) ∙ �P𝑢�𝑩�𝑨�P𝑢�𝑨� ⋅ cos(∆). 15
 
 
The phase shift parameter ∆ relates to the impact of knowing A or 𝐴 for assessing the likelihood of B. 
This angle is zero if the subspaces corresponding to the events A and then B (or 𝐴 and then B) are 
orthogonal. If they are not orthogonal, the subspaces are incompatible. This means that if a 
participant decides for B, then he/she must necessarily be undecided with regard to A. From a 
psychological perspective, the interference term is the correlation between two decision paths: For 
the Hawaiian vacation example considered in Section 3.2, (i) First consider you won’t pass the exam 
and then consider the trip to Hawaii and (ii) first consider you will pass the exam and then consider 
the trip to Hawaii. A negative correlation corresponds to a negative interference term (∂(A,B)<0 in 
(22)), which negatively affects the law of total probability (i.e., reduces the probability for the trip, in 
the unknown case), and conversely for a positive correlation.  
Considering the numerical values of the Hawaiian vacation example,  {P(B|A) = 0.54, P(B|𝐴) = 
0.57, P(B) = 0.32}, we get a value of -.23 for the interference term (assuming the chances for passing 
and not passing are equal), and from this outcome we can fit the phase shift parameter:  cos(∆) = 
−0.42, i.e. ∆ = 114°.  
 
4.5 The conjunction fallacy 
We will demonstrate now how asymmetric conjunction resolves this conjunction fallacy discussed in 
Section 3.3 in the quantum probabilistic case. We can define the conjunction effect as difference 
P(A;B) − P(B) with the actual numerical value of +0.13 found for the Linda-example reviewed above.  
Obviously, the results contradict the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory: The conjunction 
of two propositions can never get a higher probability than each of the two conjuncts. We will 
demonstrate now how asymmetric conjunction resolves this conjunction puzzle in the quantum 
probabilistic case. Considering equations (22b) and (23), we get the following expression for the 
conjunction effect:  
(24)  P(A; B) − P(B) = − P(𝑨;𝑩) − 2 ⋅ �P(𝑨;𝑩)⋅  P(𝑨;𝑩)  ⋅ cos(∆). 
 
According to classical probability theory, the value of the conjunction effect is always negative. This 
corresponds to the case of commuting operators A and B, and can be expressed by assuming ∆=π/2 
                                                          
15 Proof of this equation:  Pu(BA𝑩 
 + 𝑩AB) = u ⋅ (BA𝑩  + 𝑩AB) (u) = (u ⋅  𝑩AB(u))* + u ⋅  𝑩AB(u) = 
2 RE(u ⋅  𝑩AB(u)) = 2 RE(A𝑩(u) ⋅ AB(u)) = 2 || A𝑩(u) || || AB(u)|| ⋅ cos(∆).  
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or cos(∆) = 0). The conjunction effect can be positive if cos(∆) is negative (e.g., if cos(∆)= −1 or ∆=π). 
In the example case with P(B) = 0.38 (Linda is a bank teller), P(A) = 0.61 (Linda is a feminist), P(A; B) = 
0.51 (Linda is a feminist bank teller), we get a conjunction effect P(A; B) − P(B) = 0.13. This 
corresponds to a parameter cos(∆) = −0.9 assuming P(𝐴;𝐵) = 0.09 (Linda is a non-feminist bank 
teller).  
The present approach followed Conte and Khrennikov (e.g. Conte et al. 2008; Khrennikov 2003a, 
2003b, 2006) who pioneered the investigation of interference effects in cognitive macro-systems. 
The same idea can be used for modelling data on the conjunction and disjunction of concepts.  
Research pioneered by Hampton and others concerning the structure of vague concepts provides 
significant empirical basis showing deviations from set theoretic rules in conceptual combination 
(Hampton 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Budescu and Wallsten 1995). The relevant empirical results include 
violations of the conjunction and disjunction rules, the famous ‘guppy effect’, and cases of 
‘dominance’, ‘over- and underextension’, which were all successfully described on the basis of 
quantum principles (Aerts 2009; Aerts and Gabora 2005).  
For linguists, the distinction between vagueness and prototypicality is very important (Kamp and 
Partee 1997). While classical models have huge problems to model this distinction, it is quite easy to 
model it in quantum approaches. Concepts are modelled like propositions as projection operators 
where the Hilbert space defines the set of instances (feature vectors). The corresponding measure 
functions define the graded membership function for the described concept. In addition, within the 
positive eigenspace of this operator there is a low-dimensional subspace defined which describes the 
relevant prototypes of the category. Projecting into this subspace provides a measure function for 
typicality (Blutner 2009; Blutner et al. 2013). 
 
4.6 Order effects 
Recently, Wang and Busemeyer (2013) have shown that the quantum approach can describe all four 
types of order effects we have considered in Section 3.4. They treat the ordering effect very similar 
to the disjunction effect, namely in terms of the asymmetric conjunction (see Section 4.4). Let the 
question order effect be the difference between the probabilities for B in the contexts A and 𝑨 and 
the probability for B in a neutral context, i.e. the difference P(A; B) + P(𝑨;𝑩) − P(B). This difference 
has the negative amount of the interference term that was introduced in (22):  −∂(A,B) = 
−P(𝑨𝑩𝑨+𝑨𝑩𝑨). For simplicity, we consider pure states u only at the moment as we did in case of 
calculating the disjunction effect (Section 4.4). Then we obtain the following expression for the 
question order effect: 
 
(25) −∂u(A, B) = 2Pu(A; B) – 2(Pu(A) Pu(B))½ cosδ 
 
Here, δ is a phase shift parameter introduced by factorizing the complex number defined by the 
scalar product Au ⋅ Bu.16
                                                          
16 Assuming that we follow the Born-rule for calculating probabilities, we can derive the question ordering 
effect (25) in the following way:  
 In the classical case of commuting operators the order effect becomes zero. 
−∂u(A, B) = Pu(A; B) + Pu(𝑨; B) − Pu(B) = 
BAu ⋅ BAu + 𝑩𝑨u ⋅ 𝑩𝑨u − (BAu + 𝑩𝑨u) ⋅ (BAu + 𝑩𝑨u) = 
−BAu ⋅ 𝑩𝑨u − 𝑩𝑨u ⋅ BAu = 
−2 Re(BAu ⋅ 𝑩𝑨u) = 
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In the non-classical case of non-commuting operators we can describe all four classes of ordering 
effects. For instance, let us assume that Pu(A) > Pu(B), and Pu(A; B) > Pu(B; A), then the consistency 
(assimilation) effect is obtained by stipulating Pu(A; B) > cosδ > Pu(B; A). Similarly, for the contrast 
effect we assume Pu(A; B) < cosδ < Pu(B; A); and correspondingly for addition and subtraction (cf. 
Blutner 2012).   
The phenomenon of order effects convincingly illustrates that quantum models of cognition are 
much more powerful than simply fitting parameters to a collection of isolated phenomena. We think 
that quantum models sometimes have the potential of providing real explanations. This suggests that 
− once the relevant parameters are fixed − the theory can make predictions about correlations 
between different effects (Atmanspacher and Römer 2012). An excellent example is provided by 
Wang’s and Busemeyer’s (2013) verification of what they call the ‘law of reciprocity’:17
 
 
(26)  P(A; B) + P(𝑨;𝑩) = P(B; A) + P(𝑩;𝑨) 
 
The theorem can be tested by considering two questions that are answered one immediately after 
the other with no possibility to insert additional information in between. The yes-answer for a 
question can be seen as realizing proposition A (or B, respectively), whereas the no-answer 
corresponds to the proposition 𝑨  (or 𝑩, respectively). The empirical test of reciprocity (Wang and 
Busemeyer 2013; see also Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012) was surprisingly successful with one 
exception, the test of examples producing subtractive effects. It could be argued that in the latter 
case the key assumption of the model, no intervening information between the two events, is 
violated. 
There is a variety of other examples where quantum models have proven their explanatory 
value: the simultaneous explanation of the conjunction and disjunction fallacies (Busemeyer & Bruza 
2012, p. 126 ff), the prediction of borderline contradictions in case of conjoining vague predicates 
(Blutner et al. 2013), the prediction and empirical verification of inequalities for complementary 
questions in the context of Jung’s personality theory (Blutner and Hochnadel 2010), and belief 
revision in update semantics (beim Graben 2014). 
 
4.7 General discussion 
In Section 3 we have discussed some puzzles of bounded rationality. Classical decision theory based 
on standard probabilities, i.e. measure functions on the basis of Boolean algebras, cannot resolve 
these problems and for that reason they have been called puzzles. Further, we have introduced 
prospect theory and modifications thereof, and we have discussed how these models can help to 
solve the puzzles. For instance, we have argued that the Allais paradox can be resolved by using a 
single uniform function γ that models the deformation of probabilities by certain reference points, a 
basic assumption of prospect theory. Further, we have reported that for solving the Ellsberg puzzle a 
substantial modification of prospect theory is required, one that introduces a new weighting function 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
−2 Re(BAu ⋅ (B−BA)u) = 
2 BAu ⋅ BAu −2 Re(Au ⋅ Bu) = 
2Pu(A; B) – 2(Pu(A) Pu(B))½ cosδ. 
 
17 This theorem is the same as Niestegge’s (2008) Axiom 1. Busemeyer and Bruza (2012) have given a 
proof for the theorem, both by considering pure states and by considering the more general density matrixes.  
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(called a capacity in formal theories of reasoning). Next, we have argued that the disjunction effect 
cannot be explained by this modification and a new psychological idea is required (based on the 
failure of plausible reasoning when the conditions are unknown). For resolving conjunction and 
disjunction fallacies yet another new idea is required − the idea of representativeness. 
Summarizing, the impression is unavoidable that prospect theory (and their modifications) make 
isolated stipulations in order to describe apparently isolated phenomena. This is not really a 
satisfying theoretical situation (even if some authors have tried to make a virtue out of necessity). 
Models based on quantum probabilities (i.e., measure functions on the basis of orthomodular lattices 
such as Hilbert space projection lattices) improve the situation drastically. Allais paradox and Ellsberg 
puzzle can be resolved by the standard matrix formalism of expected utility where some non-
diagonal elements of the utility matrix have to be taken into account. The remaining puzzles are 
described as interference phenomena and crucially rely on the operation of asymmetric conjunction. 
It should be stressed that the available models of quantum cognition are still based on several 
stipulations (size and sign of the interference effect, additional parameters for the utility matrices). 
With a proper fit of the respective parameters, we are able to describe the available data. However, 
descriptions are not yet explanations.  Proper explanations are very close to predictions of effects 
based on independently motivated assumptions. We think that quantum models sometimes have the 
potential of providing explanations and do more than just describing a list of (isolated) phenomena. 
Once the relevant parameters are fixed, the theory can make predictions about correlations between 
different effects (as discussed in Section 4.6).  
There is another opportunity to overcome the shortcomings of purely descriptive models. This is 
the exploration of foundational research questions. In the following sections, we will leave the 
descriptional level and advance to a more foundational level. This may help to achieve better 
understanding why the quantum models can be successful.  
5.  Phenomenological and foundational research programs 
In the last section, we have outlined how quantum cognition can be seen as a phenomenological 
research program18
The distinction between phenomenological and foundational research programs is not a 
mainstream issue in the current philosophy of science. However, it is lively discussed within 
particular disciplines such as physics (e.g., Streater and Wightman 1964; Piron 1976), chemistry (e.g., 
Carbó 1995), and linguistics (e.g., Hinzen 2000). With regard to the foundational perspective, we 
have to distinguish two different kinds of foundational research. One kind intends to reduce 
phenomenological aspects to a deeper level of description (such as explaining chemical properties by 
 that solves several puzzles of bounded rationality. Not every cognitive scientist 
will be convinced by the proposed analyses and some researchers might ask for a deeper motivation 
of the technical instrument of quantum probabilities. In other words, they might ask why this 
formalism is appropriate. Is there a handful of independently motivated principles that account for 
the character of quantum probability? In Section 6 we will give a positive answer to this question. 
This justifies the claim that we are following a research program that can truly be called foundational. 
                                                          
18 The term ‘phenomenological’ as used in this paper is not intended to refer to the use of this term in the 
philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. In the Husserlian tradition, the phenomenological researcher aims to 
describe and to understand the meaning of the participants’ lived experiences. In the present broader use of 
this term, we simply refer to any research that tries to analyse/model/explain some empirical phenomenon in 
the domain under discussion (independently of the feelings, motivations and seeks for ‘meanings’ of the 
involved observers)  
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molecular structures). The other type of foundational research tries to get a deeper understanding of 
the theoretical instruments by reducing them to a small set of independently motivated first 
principles (Primas 1990). These principles are all stated at the same ’level’ of description by a series 
of axioms or postulates. Accordingly, the second type of foundational research is anti-reductionist. 
In the following, we will concentrate on the second way of understanding foundational research. 
We will give first some examples in order to illustrate several aspects of foundational research and 
finally we will present some basic traits generally characterizing foundational research in the domain 
of cognitive science. This paves the way for a proper understanding of the foundational approach to 
quantum probabilities as considered in later sections. 
 The first example concerns quantum theory and quantum field theory. In their influential book, 
Streater and Wightman (1964) stress the needs of an axiomatic treatment of quantum field theory in 
order to answer such questions as “what is a quantized field?” and “what are the physically 
indispensable attributes of a quantized field?” Each theoretical achievement requires abstraction and 
idealizations (Stokhof and van Lambalgen 2011). Without this, a powerful and simple theory is not 
possible. However, idealizations or abstractions can lead to inconsistences of the whole theoretical 
system.  
 
“In fact, the main problem of quantum field theory turned out to be to kill it or cure it: either to 
show that the idealizations involved in the fundamental notions of the theory (relativistic 
invariance, quantum mechanics, local fields, etc.) are incompatible in some physical sense, or to 
recast the theory in such a form that it provides a practical language for the description of 
elementary particle dynamics.” (Streater and Wightman 1964, p. 1).  
 
The quest for internal consistency is often paired with the search for representation theorems that 
realize the axiomatically defined abstract structures through concrete mathematical structures. For 
quantum field theory this has been achieved by means of algebraic quantum theory (Haag 1992) 
where von Neumann’s (1932) irreducibility postulate of conventional Hilbert space quantum 
mechanics was relaxed in favour of infinite-dimensional observable algebras. A classic example for 
another representation theory is the realization of abstract Boolean algebras by a field of sets. 
Another class of examples is due to fundamental representation theorems in the theory of 
measurement (Suppes et al. 1989). And Tversky (1977) developed a famous representation theorem 
for the representation of similarity in terms of features.  
  
5.1 Linguistic example 
Before we can conclude this section, we will illustrate the difference between phenomenological and 
foundational research program by an actual example from linguistics. In the last couple of years, 
within theoretical and philosophical linguistics, a lot of work was devoted to the comparison 
between Chomsky’s (1995) minimalistic program and the earlier approach of principle and 
parameters (Chomsky 1981). Here are some claims of how to contrast the two programs (we roughly 
follow the outline in Hinzen 2000): 
 
- What Chomsky calls “minimalism” is the search for general explanatory principles such as 
computational efficiency and related economy principles. It is one thing to find certain 
effects and an appropriate description of them (Principles and Parameters) and it is another 
thing to ask why this should be as it is (“minimalism”).  
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- The aim of “minimalism” is to derive the earlier developed generalizations, principles, and 
explanations from independently needed more general principles. The task is to eliminate 
merely technical solutions.  
- The attempt of “minimalism” is to rationalize the domain under discussion rather than to 
describe it (as in “principles and parameters”).  
- “Minimalism” tries to make sense of the different facts. Listing of facts is one thing, 
understanding them is another thing. Obviously, the Husserlian idea of ‘phenomenology’ 
refers to Chomsky’s foundational program of minimalism.  
- The evolving theory should be free of inner contradictions and conflicts. This relates to the 
interpretational issue discussed earlier. Even when the current theoretical debate is far from 
providing mathematical insights about the underlying structure and algebraic properties,19
 
 it 
should not be disregarded as a substantive research prospect (Sternefeld 2012). 
What we can learn from these discussions is that foundational approaches (such as minimalism) and 
phenomenological approaches (such as “principles and parameters”) are different modes of inquiry 
rather than different theories. In this sense, foundational approaches are not in competition with 
phenomenological ones. The choice for one of the two approaches is a free decision determined by 
our interests; there is no way to argue against the “wrong” approach. Both have their justification. 
However, in the history of science it is sometimes more useful to pursue one direction and not the 
other. It further should be added that a sound distinction between foundational and 
phenomenological programs should focus on the issue of representational theorems. The 
development of representational theorems is one of the main tasks of foundational research. It 
develops independently motivated abstract structures and proves how they can be realized by 
particular concrete structures. The latter can be applied in phenomenological research for describing 
particular phenomena and sensations.  
5.2 A historical note about complementarity 
One of the most important ideas of quantum mechanics is the concept of complementarity. 
Originally, the idea came from the psychology of consciousness, in particular the writings of William 
James:   
 
It must be admitted, therefore, that in certain persons, at least, the total possible consciousness 
may be split into parts which coexist but mutually ignore each other, and share the objects of 
knowledge between them. More remarkable still, they are complementary. (James 1890)  
 
As noted by Max Jammer (1989), Nils Bohr, one of the founding fathers of quantum theory, was 
acquainted with the writings of James, and he has borrowed that idea from him.20
                                                          
19 However, it should be noticed that beim Graben and Gerth  (2012) presented a geometric 
representation theory for minimalist grammars in a mathematical sense. 
 In turn, Bohr 
introduced the idea into physics (complementarity of momentum and position), and he proposed to 
apply it beyond physics to human knowledge in general. However, his physical conception of 
complementarity is quite different from James’, and his often-cited claim to apply it to human 
knowledge was never concretized by Bohr.  In chapter VII of his book (James 1890) − on more than 
10 pages − James describes several phenomena which illustrate the splitting of consciousness into 
20 Similarly, in a letter to Stapp, Werner Heisenberg mentions “that Niels Bohr was very interested in the 
ideas of William James”. (Stapp 1972, p. 1112) 
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parts that are not accessible from each other. For example, these phenomena concern the 
“unconsciousness in hysterics” (p. 202), partial blindness under “post-hypnotic suggestion” (p. 207) 
or the splitting of a person in several selves in “alcoholic delirium” (p.208).  One example describes 
the common situation of partial anaesthesia:  
 
The mother who is asleep to every sound but the stirrings of her babe, evidently has the babe-
portion of her auditory sensibility systematically awake. Relatively to that, the rest of her mind is 
in a state of systematized anaesthesia. That department, split off and disconnected from the 
sleeping part, can none the less wake the latter up in case of need. (p. 213) 
 
Another example refers to the famous subject “Lucie” who was in a state of “post-hypnotic 
suggestion” and could see of all the cards covering her lap only those cards that were not a multiple 
of 3. She was particularly blind to numbers such as 9, 12, 15. Hence, the part consisting of the 
multiples of 3 was split off and disconnected from the part of numbers. However, under special 
conditions, when she had not to tell which cards she saw but to write it down by her hand, the other 
part of the numbers was accessible (p. 207).  
Taking all the examples together, it seems adequate to use the term “autoepistemic 
accessibility” to refer to these phenomena. We use the term “autoepistemic” to refer to the 
epistemic states of a human subject who can reflect on her own epistemic states.21
It should be noted that the related term of “epistemic accessibility”  has been introduced by 
beim Graben and Atmanspacher (2006) in a not so different sense.  In their approach, the term refers 
to an external observer and his measurement apparatus for describing the “microstates” a dynamical 
system. These states are not accessible by macroscopic measurements which only provide a coarse-
graining of the state space into “macrostates”. In philosophical contexts, often the term observer-
dependency is used for this phenomenon (Searle 1980, 1998). In this sense, different macroscopic 
measurement devices appear as complementary when they lead to such differences in epistemic 
accessibility. This phenomenon is pertinent in the neurosciences when different measurements such 
as fMRI or EEG generate different coarse-grainings of the brain’s state space thus leading to 
incompatible descriptions of neurodynamics in the sense of Acacio de Barros and Suppes (2009). In 
the next subsection we will explain this idea in detail.   
 If two different 
states are not simultaneously epistemically accessible to the subject under discussion then they can 
be seen as complementary in James’ sense.  
Bohr’s concept of complementarity is clearly not copied from James’ epistemic conception. As 
pointed out by Murdoch (Murdoch 1987, p. 55), the first occurrence of the word “complementarity” 
in Bohr’s correspondence is in a letter to Pauli  of August 13, 1927:  
 
What you write about your and Jordan’s work on electrodynamics is extremely attractive and is 
very much in agreement with my own view about the nature of quantum theory, according to 
which the apparently contradictory requirements of superposition and individuality do not 
subsume contrary but complementary sides of nature. I am in complete agreement with your 
remarks on de Broglie’s work: he is trying to achieve the impossible by a blending of two sides of 
the matter.” (Cited from Murdoch 1987, p. 55). 
 
                                                          
21 The term “autoepistemic” is widely used in (non-monotonic) logic, e.g. Moore (1988). Even when the 
reasoning component is not essential for the present treatment, one basic idea is present: an agent refers to 
his own epistemic states. 
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The terms “superposition” and “individuality” refer to the wave and particle, and in a draft version 
for a note to Nature referring to the wave-particle duality of light the word “complementarity” 
occurs in the very same sense:  
 
It seems that we here meet with an unavoidable dilemma, … the question being not of a choice 
between two different rivalizing concepts but rather of the description of two complementary 
sides of the same phenomenon.  (Cited from Murdoch 1987, p. 55. The emendations are Bohr’s) 
 
Bohr’s conception of complementarity refers to the laws of nature rather than to the idea of 
(auto)epistemic accessibility as in James’ writings. In other words, it is an ontic conception rather 
than an epistemic one. 
Closely related to Bohr’s concept of complementarity is Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty 
principle.22
 
 In his book, Die physikalischen Prinzipien der Quantentheorie, Heisenberg (1944) starts his 
introduction of the uncertainty relation with another important idea of Nils Bohr: In order to find the 
right restrictions were the classical particle picture of physics can be applied one has to remember 
the idea that all facts of atomic physics that are describable in space and time have to be describable 
in the wave picture as well (p. 9). In the simplest case, a particle can be described in the wave picture 
by a ‘wave packet’. However, for a wave packet no precise location and no precise velocity can be 
defined since the wave packet has a tendency to be dispersed over the whole space. According to the 
simple laws of optics the following uncertainty relation can be derived  
(27)  ∆q ⋅ ∆p ≥ h  
 
Hereby, ∆q and ∆p denote the standard deviation (measuring the dispersion) of position and 
momentum, respectively. The constant h is given as Planck’s quantum of action relating radiation 
energy (E) to frequency (f) in the equation E = h⋅f. 
After explaining this optical picture of the uncertainty relation, Heisenberg makes clear that the 
uncertainty relations can be derived without reference to the wave picture by using the general 
schemes of quantum theory and its physical interpretation (Heisenberg 1944, p. 11). In fact, he 
provides a brief derivation of the principle (27) based on the matrix formalism of probability 
amplitudes. Generally, it is the complementarity of certain observables (expressed by their non-
commutativity or order-dependence of the relevant operators) that allows the derivation of 
uncertainty relations.  The general conclusion is that the uncertainty relations restrict the probability 
distributions predicted by the general formalism of quantum theory which apply to arbitrary physical 
states of the quantum system.  
Yet another aspect of Heisenberg’s discussion of the uncertainty relation deserves our attention.  
Obviously, irrespective of the concrete realization of physical states (as a wave packets or whatever), 
only the statistics of their measurements (or the probabilities of our expectations) satisfy this 
principle. In this sense, quantum theory can be seen as an abstract mathematical apparatus that acts 
like a kind of meta-theory and provides a new kind of language that allows to generalizing on a 
variety of particular mechanisms (partly known from optics and wave theory).  
In Section 2 of his book, Heisenberg (1944) continues on this idea and provides several examples 
that demonstrate how measurements can change the state of a quantum system in order to satisfy 
                                                          
22 The term uncertainty principle is a translation of the German term Unschärfeprinzip or 
Unbestimmtheitsprinzip. 
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the uncertainty relation. In this sense, the uncertainty relation formulates a property of the abstract 
meta-theory: there is no way to prepare a quantum state where the described object (electron, 
photon, etc.) has a sharp location and a sharp momentum at the same time. 
To say it in an embellished way: quantum theory is not really required and it is actually 
superfluous in a certain sense. You can get many of its results by cleverly combining classical 
mechanics, optics, and wave theory as had been carried out by the pioneers of naïve quantum 
physics, such as Einstein, Bohr, Sommerfeld, and de Broglie between 1905 and 1925. However, 
quantum mechanics provides a unified framework for formulating all these things more 
systematically. This hint can be helpful to understand the mathematical underpinnings of quantum 
theory for cognitive science. Again, the mathematical formalism is a kind of meta-theory that 
provides a useful language generalizing ideas known from neural network research, dynamic system 
theory, update semantics, and other frameworks.  
Let us return now to the interpretational problem for probabilities. In quantum theory, a deep 
problem concerns the nature of the state vector. There are two basic questions the answers of which 
decide about its basic nature: (i) Does the state vector directly describe reality or is it related to our 
knowledge of the system?  (ii) Does the state vector describe a single object (particle or wave) or 
does is describe a whole ensemble of objects (or an ensemble of experiments with the object)? In 
modern quantum theory (contrasting with naïve quantum physics), the state vectors are connected 
with probabilities. However, there are three different interpretations of the whole concept of 
probability (e.g., Hájek 2012): frequency interpretation, subjective probability, and propensity 
interpretation. It is interesting to see how the different answers to the two basic questions 
concerning how state vectors relate to the involved concept of probability.  
It was Max Born (1955) who gave a realistic answer to the first question, and he gave the 
ensemble answers to the second question. His concept of probability is clearly seeing probabilities as 
relative frequencies. There are deep conceptual problems with Born’s approach, some of them are 
overcome by Ballentine’s ensemble approach (Ballentine 1970). 
Another realist conception assumes that the state vector describes a single object by giving 
probabilities a propensity interpretation (Popper 1959). Propensities can be assumed of being some 
kind of abstract, objective forces (unobservable dispositional properties) that provide a measure of 
the tendency of a situation to produce a certain event. Of course, Popper’s article was an attack 
against Heisenberg’s Copenhagen interpretation, which is based on a subjective interpretation of 
probabilities (reflecting our knowledge or our “consciousness” of particles).23
The third possibility is to assume an epistemic interpretation of the state vector and to assume 
that the state vector describes single objects. This clearly is the view of Heisenberg’s Copenhagen 
interpretation with a subjective interpretation of probabilities. As made clear recently, this view does 
not necessarily entail observer-induced wave packet collapse (Barnum et al. 2000; Caves et al. 2002a, 
  
                                                          
23 Usually, Niels Bohr is taken as one of the main proponents of the “Copenhagen interpretation”. 
However, as pointed out by Howard (2004), Bohr’s view differs dramatically from Heisenberg’s concerning the 
privileged role for the observer (positivism), in particular the observer-induced collapse of the state vector. 
Further, Heisenberg followed Einstein’s leadership in reinterpreting (“umdeuten”) basic concepts of physics, 
such as time, position and momentum. In contrast, Bohr followed Kant’s philosophy in assuming that Human 
beings are endowed with the ability to think and imagine according to certain classical categories and schemas. 
We simply cannot get around the classical schemas in our thinking. Bohr concluded that in our thinking about 
the microscopic world we are forced to depend on classical categories and schemata grasping concepts such as 
position and momentum. 
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2002b). More importantly, this picture conforms to the predominant picture of the Bayesian 
interpretation in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Psychology. Hence, it is suggestive to take this 
interpretation as the basic conception of probability in quantum cognition.  
In the following section, we will concretize the notion of (auto)epistemic accessibility based on 
the operational interpretation of quantum physics. The operational setting suggests a particular 
algebraic structure for modelling propositions, one that is very different from the classical Boolean 
setting. The Boolean setting allows to model propositions as sets of possible worlds (with the 
operation of union, intersection and complement for the basic propositional operations. In contrast, 
the operational setting motivates a non-Boolean algebraic structure that invites to model 
propositions by subspaces of a Hilbert space or by projection operators of the Hilbert space and the 
corresponding lattice-theoretic operations. The algebra of propositions is defined by non-statistical 
axioms.  Hence, the operational understanding does not require any notion of probability. The 
concept of probability will emerge by means of a measure function, its subjective interpretation can 
be motivated by a (quantum) de Finetti representation theorem (Barnum et al. 2000; Caves et al. 
2002a, 2002b). Hereby, probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief, which are justified by axioms 
of fair bedding behaviour.  
In this section, we have seen that James psychological conception of complementarity is clearly 
an epistemic one. In quantum physics, there is a big debate about the relationship between ontic and 
epistemic interpretations of complementarity, which will not concern us here further. Another 
historical lecture points to the abstract character of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory. 
It forms a kind of meta-theory providing a useful language for expressing certain generalizations, 
hopefully also in the domain of cognitive science. 
6. Bounded rationality and the foundation of quantum 
probabilities  
We come back now to the operational interpretation of quantum physics – an interpretation that is 
grounded in the reality of the process of measurement (contrasting with interpretations which 
assume real values for measurements before the measurements are actually carried out, before the 
questions are really asked). As we will see, this interpretation nicely fits with our concern of 
grounding the basic design features of quantum cognition. Instead of performing ‘measurements’ we 
confront our subjects with ‘questions’ in cognitive science. And in both cases we notice the ‘answers’ 
of our system and get a probabilistic outcome.  
The mentioned design features can be based on a fairly abstract axiomatic framework, as found 
in the  mathematical language of formal logic (as pioneered by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936)). 
These features are free from any direct concern to a statistical or probabilistic interpretation. They 
concern what sometimes is called ‘general quantum physics’ (Piron, 1972) or ‘generalized quantum 
theory’ (Atmanspacher et al. 2002). This is a passage illustrating the crucial issue: 
  
 “It is also clear that a satisfactory axiomatic structure of the kind referred to above cannot be 
formulated a priori in terms of wave functions, since their use would imply a statistical 
interpretation at the outset. The role of the wave functions in general quantum physics must 
emerge from the analysis of the more fundamental theory. As said above, the linear structure of 
the Hilbert space does appear, without reference to any statistical notions, as the appropriate 
description of general quantal systems (a set consisting of a family of Hilbert spaces describes 
systems which are not purely quantal, and the purely classical limit is described by a family of 
trivial one-dimensional Hilbert spaces). It is in this way that the statistical interpretation for wave 
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mechanics will emerge as a consequence of essentially nonstatistical axioms, and what is 
presupposed in classical physics is clearly brought into evidence.” (Piron 1972) 
 
6.1 Operational realism  
Classical (Kolmogorov) probability is based on a certain sample space S (also called the set of possible 
states/worlds). In this picture, propositions are considered to be subsets of S. The notion of a 
‘random variable’ is of particular importance for classical theory. A random variable α� on a sample 
space S is a function from S onto some range α (called the test range); for example, α can be a set of 
arbitrary ‘symbols’ or a set of natural or real numbers. The proposition that the value of the random 
variable α� is x (for some x∈α) can be defined as follows: 
 
(28) 𝜋(α� = 𝑥) =𝑑𝑒𝑓 {𝑠 ∈ 𝑆: α�(𝑠) = 𝑥}  
 
It is easy to see that the system of propositions generated by 𝜋(α� = 𝑥) considering all x∈α defines a 
partition of the sample space S.  
Similarly to the literature on test spaces (Wilce 2009), we consider all subsets X of a test range α 
and call these subsets ‘events’ of the random variable α�. With each of these events a particular 
proposition (also called logical event) is connected; this is the proposition that the value of the 
random variable α� is an element of the considered subset X: 
  
(29) 𝜋(α� ∈ 𝑋) =𝑑𝑒𝑓 {𝑠 ∈ 𝑆: α�(𝑠) ∈ 𝑋}  
 
If we consider the set of all propositions generated by 𝜋(α� ∈ 𝑋) for any X ⊆ α (including the empty 
set), and if we order these propositions by the subset relation, then we get a Boolean lattice. We call 
these propositions experimental or testable propositions. Yet this Boolean lattice is only a partial one, 
i.e. not all subsets of S are testable propositions.  
The interesting question is what happens when we consider several of such partial Boolean 
lattices (defined by different random variables) and form the ‘union’ of these lattices. The obvious 
answer is that we do not get a Boolean lattice again. Instead, we obtain a so-called ‘orthomodular’ 
lattice. An orthomodular lattice is weaker than a Boolean lattice. Technically, it is a bounded lattice 
(the bounds are 0, 1) with join ∨ and meet ∧, and on the lattice a unary operation ‘  (ortho-
complementation) is defined such that, for all elements x and y of the lattice: 
 
(30)       a.  x’’ = x 
b.   if x ≤ y then y’ ≤ x’ 
c.   x ∧ x’ = 0 
d.   if  x ≤ y then y = x ∨ (x’ ∧ y) (orthomodular law) 
 
Two elements x and y are called orthogonal iff x ≤ y’. An orthomodular lattice is a Boolean lattice, if in 
addition we have distributivity:  x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z). It can be shown (e.g. Piron 1972) that 
every orthomodular lattice is the union of its maximal Boolean sublattices (called blocks). Jenca 
(2001) provides some useful generalization of this standard finding. The following example − first 
introduced und discussed by Foulis and colleagues (Foulis and Randall 1972; Foulis 1999)  − gives a 
handy illustration of the basic ideas. It defines the firefly box and its event logic. 
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Assume that there is a firefly erratically moving inside the box depicted in Figure 3. The box has 
two translucent (but not transparent) windows, one at the front and another one at the right. All 
other sides of the box are opaque. In principle, the firefly can be situated in one of the four 
quadrants {1,2,3,4}, and the firefly can be blinking or not (the latter is indicated by being in world 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  The firefly box. From perspective α�, left view (worlds 1 and 3) corresponds to 
the half space a and right view (worlds 2 and 4) corresponds to the half space b. From 
perspective β�, however, left view (worlds 1 and 2)  corresponds to the half space c and 
right view (worlds 3 and 4) corresponds to the half space d, by contrast. 
 
  
For an external observer, the position of the firefly in one of the four quadrants is not visible even if 
the firefly is blinking. For testing whether the firefly is blinking and where it is the external observer 
can take one of two perspectives: 
 
α�: looking at the front window. If no blinking can be seen the outcome is n; if the blinking is at 
the left part the outcome is a; if the blinking is at the right part the outcome is b. 
 
β�: looking at the side window: again no blinking is registered by n; if the blinking is at the left 
part the outcome is c; if the blinking is at the right part the outcome is d.  
 
These two perspectives can be described by the sets α = {a, b, n} and β = {c, d, n}.  As already noted, 
all subsets of α generate a (partial) Boolean algebra of events. The same holds for all subsets of β. 
The results for testing {a, b} and {c, d} will be always the same − they are epistemically equivalent 
(beim Graben and Atmanspacher 2006, 2009). We can express this fact by saying that both events 
realize the same experimental proposition: π{a, b} = π{c, d}. Further, calling X’ the complement of the 
event X, we can postulate that π{n’} = π{a, b}.   Hence, for both perspectives we have eight 
2 
b 
4 3 
1 
a c 
d 
perspective α� 
perspective ?̂? 
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experimental propositions:  π{a}, π{b}, π{n}, π{a, b} = π{n’}, π{a, n} =  π{b’}, π{b, n}  = π{a’},  π{a, b, n}  
= 1 and π{} = 0. 
Two experimental propositions π{X} and π{Y} are called compatible iff the sub-lattice generated 
by {π{X}, π{Y}, π{X’}, π{Y’}} is distributive. For instance π{a} and π{b} are compatible but π{a}, π{c} are 
not. Experimental propositions that are not compatible are called complementary. Hence, π{a} and 
π{c} are complementary and so are π{a’} and π{c’}. As a matter of fact, two propositions of different 
blocks (i.e., generated by two different perspectives), where one does not contain the other 
informationally, are always complementary.  
We get an explicit expression of the experimental (testable) propositions as sets of situations, 
and a set-theoretic idea of their identity and inclusion conditions, when we formulate two random 
variables 𝛼�(𝑠) and ?̂?(𝑠) as defined in Table 1. With this instrument we can see, for instance, that 
π{a} = {1,3}, π{a, b} = {1,2,3,4}, and π{c, d} = {1,2,3,4}. Hence, we obtain  π{a, b} = π{c, d} and π{a} ≤ 
π{a, b} etc.  
 
 
Possible  states s 1 2 3 4 5 
𝛼�(𝑠) a b a b n 
?̂?(𝑠) c c d d n 
 
Table 1. Two perspectives to model the firefly box by using random variables. 
 
Figure 4 shows the two arising Boolean lattices of testable propositions based on the two 
perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Two Boolean lattices resulting from the event algebras of perspective α� (left part) and 
perspective β� (right part), respectively.  
 
Now consider the union of the two perspectives which results in the lattice shown in Figure 5.  
  
 π{b’} 
 
1 
 π{a’}  π{n’} 
 
0 
 π{a}  π{b} 
 
 π{n} 
 
 π{c’} 
 
1 
 π{d’}  π{n’} 
 
0 
 π{n}  π{c} 
 
 π{d} 
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Figure 5.  The union of the two Boolean lattices from Figure 4 
 
The resulting lattice is orthomodular but not Boolean. The non-Boolean character is a consequence 
of the violation of distributivity. For instance, consider π{a} ∨ (π{a’} ∧ π{d’}) = π{a} ∨ π{n} = π{b’}. 
Distributivity would predict the equivalence with the term (π{a} ∨ π{a’}) ∧ (π{a} ∨ π{d’}). However, 
both parts of the conjunction give 1, and hence the whole expression comes out as 1. Since π{b’} is 
different from 1, distributivity is violated.  
Atoms are events A ≠ 0 such that there is no event x ≤ A unless x = 0 or x = A. A lattice is called 
atomistic iff for each element x ≠ 0 of the lattice there exists some atom A ≤ x. The atomic covering 
law states that for any atom A the event A ∨ x covers x (i.e. no element of the lattice lies strictly 
between A ∨ x and x).  Wilce (2012) discusses several arguments that could help to motivate atomic 
covering. The example illustrated in Figure 4 is obviously atomistic and satisfying the atomic covering 
law. Yet there is another condition – irreducibility. An orthomodular lattice is called irreducible iff it 
cannot be expressed as a non-trivial direct product of simpler orthomodular lattices. Again, our 
firefly example lattice satisfies this condition. 
Atomistic, irreducible orthomodular lattices satisfying the atomic covering law are called Piron 
lattices (after Piron, 1972 who was the first investigating such lattices). What we get by considering 
several random variables, defining the partial Boolean lattices of experimental propositions defined 
by each of these random variables, and considering the union of all these partial Boolean lattices, is a 
Piron lattice indeed.  How do Piron lattices relate to Hilbert spaces? Interestingly, the lattice 
comprised by all sub-vector spaces of a given Hilbert space is equivalent to a Piron lattice. The atoms 
of this Piron lattice are the one-dimensional Hilbert spaces, of course.  
The crucial question arising now is: how close is the connection between Piron lattices and 
projection lattices on Hilbert spaces? All projection lattices are Piron lattices. Unfortunately, the 
converse is not true: not every Piron lattice can be represented by a corresponding projection lattice. 
It needs additional conditions in order to prove the corresponding representation theorem (Solér 
1995; Holland 1995). These conditions are rather technical and concern the infinite case. If they are 
satisfied, we call the lattice a Piron-Solér lattice. In case of the firefly box the corresponding lattice 
representation theorem entails the following three-dimensional vector space where the one-
dimensional subspaces representing the atoms of the lattice are indicated by the symbols used in 
Figure 3: 
  
 π{c’} 
 
 π{d’} 
  π{c} 
 
      π{d} 
 
 π{b’} 
 
0 
   π{a’}   π{n’} 
  
 π{a}  π{b} 
 
 π{n} 
 
1 
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Figure 6.  Hilbert space representation of the firefly box representing the two Boolean blocks α = 
{a, b, n} and β = {c, d, n}.  The atoms a, b, n (and c, d, n, respectively) are represented by 
pairwise orthogonal axes. The angle ϕ between the complementary elements a, c (and 
b, d, respectively) cannot be derived by the representation theorem from the 
orthomodular lattice and depends explicitly on a chosen probability model. 
 
We see that in a Hilbert space representation compatible experimental propositions are represented 
by commuting projection operators while complementary experimental propositions are represented 
by operators that do not commute. Moreover, the complementation operator X’ is represented by 
Hilbert space orthocomplementation. Note further that the elements of the sample space S have the 
ontological status of abstract objects. They help to express the identity conditions for experimental 
propositions. However, they are not necessarily represented as subspaces in the Hilbert space. For 
instance, worlds {1} and {2} do not correspond to some subspace, only their union {1, 2} does 
(corresponding to c). However, world {5} explicitly refers to the subspace denoted by n. In case that 
the overall structure of the Piron-lattice is Boolean, the sample space S corresponds to an 
orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space. Hence, the classical case of a standard possible world 
semantics is a special case of the Hilbert space semantics.  
In Section 4.1 we have introduced the notion of an additive measure function based on the 
lattice of projection operators of a given Hilbert space and we have shown that each unit state u 
determines such a function of quantum probabilities on the testable propositions Ai of the Hilbert 
space: Pu(Ai) =  ||Ai(u)||2 .  More generally, we have seen that also each mixture (or convex 
combination) of these probabilities is an additive measure function. Now the important question is 
whether each additive measure function can be represented by the mixture of quantum probabilities 
for pure states. The positive answer is the content of Gleason’s theorem (Gleason 1957). Under the 
assumption that the dimension of the Hilbert space is larger than two, it states that each countably 
additive measure function can be expressed as the mixture (convex hull) of quantum probabilities for 
pure states (the latter following the Born rule, i.e. calculating the squared length of the projections of 
n 
b 
a c 
d 
ϕ 
ϕ 
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a given state).24
Summarizing, we have considered measurements as providing partial Boolean lattices (also 
called blocks), which can be assumed to be formed by experimental propositions. If two 
experimental propositions of different blocks are not identical but overlap, then they are called 
complementary. Building the union of several blocks results in a structure called Piron-Solér lattice. 
The fundamental representation theorem states that Piron-Solér lattices and lattices of projectors of 
a Hilbert space are equivalent. The next step is to define additive measure functions on the space of 
experimental propositions − either defined as proposed in test theory or defined as subspaces of a 
Hilbert space, i.e. projection operators.  Gleason’s theorem tells us that probabilities arise either 
from the Born rule or their convex combinations. In this way, quantum probabilities are based on the 
lattice of experimental propositions. In physics, this lattice is constituted by the algebra of 
complementary observables. In the next subsections, we will consider how the related lattice can be 
motivated in cognitive science using a dynamic venue and this leads us back to the nature of 
bounded rationality.  
  For details, the reader is referred to the original paper by Gleason, and  for a 
constructive proof see Richman & Bridges (1999). 
 
6.2 Dynamical systems and symbolic dynamics 
So far, the firefly box discussed in the previous subsection only provides a static picture about 
experimentally testable propositions. Observing the firefly’s motion inside the box over an extended 
period of time would definitely deliver additional information about its actual position. The question 
is then, whether this additional information could be used to restore a classical Kolmogorovian 
description in the limit of infinite observation time. In order to deal with this question, we have to 
discuss some basic issues of dynamical system theory (see e.g. Ott 1993).  
The firefly box can be regarded as a deterministic dynamical system with the firefly’s actual 
position (namely three Cartesian coordinates 𝒙 = [𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧]) inside the box as its state 𝒙(𝑡) at time t. 
The set of all possible states (i.e. of all possible spatial localizations) is called the phase space X.25
The unobserved firefly has a classical trajectory exploring the phase space X. As the firefly can 
only be observed when blinking, we get a temporal discretization of its continuous trajectory. In 
dynamical systems theory such discretization can be identified with stroboscopic or so-called 
Poincaré mappings. Finally, we only allow observational access either through the front window 
(perspective α�), or through the side window (perspective β�), but not through both windows 
 
Starting with some time t0 the state 𝒙(𝑡0) is called initial condition. The motion of the firefly is given 
by a one-parameter map Φ𝑡:𝑋 → 𝑋, the phase flow with parameter time 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0, ∞), such that 
𝒙(𝑡0 + 𝑡) = Φ𝑡(𝒙(𝑡0)). Following the states 𝒙(𝑡) for all times in the real interval [𝑡0, ∞), yields the 
firefly’s trajectory. 
                                                          
24 As noted in Wilce (2012), with the help of quantum probabilities (based on Gleason’s theorem) it is 
possible to reconstruct the rest of the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics, “the representation of 
‘observables’ by self-adjoint operators, and the dynamics (unitary evolution). The former can be recovered with 
the help of the Spectral theorem and the latter with the aid of a deep theorem of E. Wigner on the projective 
representations of groups.” (Wilce 2012) 
25 Of course, we could identify the points of the phase space with possible worlds. However, the idea of 
possible words is more general and takes an observer-dependent view (Searle 1998). In fact, the architect of a 
cognitive system can decide whatever he will consider as possible worlds, including entities that refer to the 
elements of a certain partition of the phase space (as we did in the previous section regarding the worlds 1, 2, 
3, 4).  
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simultaneously. Again, these perspectives provide two complementary partitions of the phase space 
X into pairwise disjoint sets. 
In order to illustrate the following argumentation let us crucially simplify the firefly box as 
follows: Assume the firefly’s motion is confined to a two-dimensional phase space, the square [-1,1] 
× [-1,1]. Assume further that the firefly moves with constant speed along a closed circle of radius 
R=1, such that it reaches its initial state 𝒙(𝑡0) after every period T again. Moreover, we suppose that 
the firefly also blinks periodically with some ratio 𝑇𝐵 = 𝑞𝑇, (0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 1). For this two-dimensional 
firefly box, the front window coincides with the x-axis while the side window coincides with the y-
axis. These views lead to two complementary partitions of the phase space X into pairwise disjoint 
sets a = [-1,0] × [-1,1], b = [0,1] × [-1,1] for perspective α�, and c = [-1,1] × [-1,0], d = [-1,1] × [0,1] for 
perspective β�. Figure 7 displays the situation. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Phase space of the two-dimensional firefly box with circular trajectory. Partitions are α 
= {a, b} (left) and β = {c, d} (right). Time discretization (“blinking”) with half period T/2. 
 
So far, we have explained the idea of a (deterministic) dynamic system. Standard examples are 
classical mechanics describing the evolution of states of the phase space (pairs of location and 
momentum for one-particle systems). In neural network research, the fast dynamics of single 
neurons/neural networks can be seen as another dynamic system. It describes the evolution of 
neuronal activation for a single neuron or the activation spreading in neural networks. 
Let us turn now to symbolic dynamics, which is a useful method for studying discrete-time 
dynamical systems with continuous state space. The crucial idea is to partition the state space into a 
finite number of subsets and to label each of these subsets with some symbol. In case of the firefly, 
the discretization of time through stroboscopic blinking and the discretization of phase space 
through partitioning, yields a symbolic representation of the system’s trajectory as a sequence of 
partition cells being visited. If there is more than one observational perspective, more than one 
partition (and labelling function) will be involved. 
In Figure 7 the initial condition belongs to rectangle b with respect to partition (perspective) α 
and to rectangle d with respect to partition β. Considering partition α first, we assign the symbol “b” 
to the initial condition 𝒙(𝑡0). When the system evolves as indicated by the arrow in Figure 7, its state 
belongs to rectangle a after a half period T/2 when blinking appears again. Thus, we can assign the 
sequence “ba” to the first two iterations. When our firefly still blinks every half period, the complete 
trajectory is mapped onto an infinite string “babababa…” which is called a symbolic dynamics (Hao 
1989; Lind and Marcus 1995). On the other hand, with respect to partition β, we assign the symbol 
“d” to the initial condition 𝒙(𝑡0). The state at time t0 + T/2 is contained in rectangle c, such that the 
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corresponding string is “dc” for the first two iterations, eventually leading to the symbolic dynamics 
“dcdcdcdc…” for the given stroboscopic discretization. 
Symbolic dynamics provides very powerful tools for discussing complex nonlinear dynamical 
systems when “unessential details” are captured by the coarse-graining of the phase space into 
partition cells. It allows investigating symbolic sequences by means of formal language and automata 
theory (Crutchfield 1994; Jiménez-Montaño et al. 2002; Moore 1990), information theory and 
Markov chains (Crutchfield and Feldman 2003; Crutchfield and Packard 1983) and algebraic quantum 
theory as well (Matsumoto 1997; Exel 2004).  
The concatenation operation of symbolic dynamics has a straightforward interpretation in terms 
of phase space propositions. Generally, the set of phase space points generating a given symbolic 
sequence when taken as initial conditions can be interpreted as the proposition represented by the 
sequence. In our first example, the sequence “ba” corresponds to the proposition Π(”ba”) = { 𝑥: 
𝑥 ∈ 𝑏 and Φ𝑇2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑎}. Since Φ𝑇2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑎 iff 𝑥 ∈ Φ−𝑇2(𝑎), we get the following proposition 
representing the sequence ”ba”:  Π(”ba”) = 𝑏 ∩  Φ−𝑇2(𝑎). Here, Φ−𝑇2(𝑎) = �𝑥 ∶  Φ𝑇2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑎� denotes 
the pre-image of the cell a. 
In general, a symbolic sequence 𝑠1𝑠2 … 𝑠𝑛 refers to the following proposition: 
  
(31)        Π(𝑠1𝑠2 … 𝑠𝑛) = ⋂ Φ−𝑘𝑇𝐵𝑛−1𝑘=0 (𝑠𝑘+1) . 
 
Therefore, any string 𝑠1𝑠2 … 𝑠𝑛 of finite length n corresponds to an intersection of pre-images of 
partition cells under the phase flow. Because the intersection of two sets is in general smaller than 
each of the original sets (unless one of them is a subset of the other), longer strings correspond to 
smaller sets of initial conditions. If this is indeed the case, one speaks about the dynamic refinement 
of a partition. 
Next, we have to distinguish two important cases. In the first one, the sets of possible initial 
conditions in phase space become smaller and smaller for increasing string lengths, eventually 
shrivelling into a singleton set which contains exactly one initial condition for an infinitely long 
symbolic sequence. In this case, which is common for chaotic dynamics where different trajectories 
are exponentially divergent, one speaks about a generating partition since the original partition 
generates the complete phase space in the limit of everlasting observation time. In other words, in 
the limit of sufficiently long symbolic sequences, we can identify each point of the phase space by 
such a sequence. There is no information lost by using the symbolic labelling method. For our two-
dimensional firefly box, we can easily construct a generating partition when the sampling frequency 
is an irrational number, say  𝑇𝐵 = √2𝑇. In this case, the iterations of  Φ𝑘𝑇𝐵(𝒙(𝑡0)) for integer 𝑘 form 
a dense set around the circular trajectory. Hence the pre-images eventually converge to some initial 
condition 𝒙(𝑡0) at the circle, as depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  Generating partition of the two-dimensional firefly box with circular trajectory. 
 
Thus, two generating partitions α and β both have the complete phase space X as their finest 
refinements such that their union is a Boolean lattice allowing for a Kolmogorovian probability 
theory.   
In the second case, even the finest dynamic refinement of an initial partition exhibits residual 
coarse grains that cannot be further refined. These residuals correspond to the only propositions that 
are epistemically accessible with respect to a given perspective. Therefore, we obtain a Boolean 
partition algebra from the finest grains of an original partition. Beim Graben & Atmanspacher (2006, 
2009) have argued that two different initial partitions α and β could yield two different Boolean 
partition algebras that are only partially overlapping. Then, our original firefly argumentation applies 
and the union of these algebras becomes an orthomodular lattice, leading to a canonical Hilbert 
space representation as required in quantum cognition. 
The question whether any two partitions α, β are compatible or complementary to each other, 
depends crucially on the stroboscopic sampling. For a half period sampling TB=T/2 we get the 
following pre-images: Φ−𝑇/2(𝑎) = 𝑏 and Φ−𝑇/2(𝑏) = 𝑎 one the one hand, and Φ−𝑇/2(𝑐) = 𝑑 and 
Φ−𝑇/2(𝑑) = 𝑐 one the other hand. As a consequence, the finest (symbolic) refinement of α is 
identically α, and the finest (symbolic) refinement of β is identically β (beim Graben et al. 2013). 
Therefore, both partitions are also dynamically complementary as no additional information is 
gained from the dynamic refinement.  
By contrast, when we take TB=T/4, the pre-images are Φ−𝑇/4(𝑎) = 𝑑 and Φ−𝑇/4(𝑏) = 𝑐 (cf. 
Figure 7). In this case, the sequence “ba”, let say, is represented by the proposition Π(”ba”) =  𝑏 ∩  Φ−𝑇4(𝑎)  = 𝑏 ∩ 𝑑. This proposition corresponds to the first quadrant of Figure 7. Hence, the 
finest refinements of both α and β is the partition of the coordinate plane X into the four quadrants. 
For this discretization, the partitions α and β become compatible rather than complementary. One 
can express this situation by stipulating that the angle ϕ from Figure 6 will be an integer multiple of 
90°.    
Interestingly, our two-dimensional firefly box is completely equivalent to the phase portrait of a 
time-discretized harmonic oscillator where the spatial position is drawn along the x-axis while its 
velocity (actually its momentum) is drawn along the y-axis. Superimposing a cosine wave along x and 
a sine wave along y yields a circular trajectory as in Figure 7. Beim Graben et al. (2013) have 
intensively discussed the epistemic quantization (beim Graben & Atmanspacher 2006, 2009) of the 
harmonic oscillator. To this end, one has to consider probability distributions, so-called statistical 
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states, of initial conditions in phase space. If these distributions are supported by the rectangles a, b 
or c, d from Figure 7, one can define statistical eigenstates either of position or of momentum by 
virtue of vanishing variance. Then, the same construction as for the two-dimensional firefly applies 
and a position eigenstate could not simultaneously be a momentum eigenstate and vice versa, which 
is exactly the situation of position/momentum complementarity in quantum physics.26
The firefly box and its dynamic counterpart, the harmonic oscillator, demonstrate that an 
epistemic quantization of an ontologically classical system is almost inevitable for coarse-grained 
descriptions. Such coarse-grainings are always due to limited precision and resolution of 
observational measurement devices. Sensory and perceptional apparatuses exhibit finite registration 
and relaxation times as well as finite resolution of their sampling ranges.  
  
We illustrate this with our harmonic oscillator example again. Suppose that switching between  
alternating measurements of α and β requires a quarter period T/4 measuring time. Observing the 
initial condition in rectangle b with respect to α as depicted in Figure 7, again, entails no information 
about its place in cells c and d with respect to β whatsoever. Consequently, this uncertainty is 
propagated through a subsequent measurement of β with respect to α, since Φ𝑇/4(𝑏) = 𝑑. 
In the previous section we found a Hilbert space representation of the firefly box exhibiting two 
Boolean blocks α = {a, b, n} and β = {c, d, n}.  In constructing this representation, a new parameter – 
the angle ϕ between the complementary elements a, c (and b, d, respectively) – has been 
introduced. The question we will investigate now is whether symbolic dynamics can provide an 
interpretation of this parameter. As the first step in answering this question, we have to implement a 
probability model to the firefly box. Following Foulis (1999) again, this is achieved by a real-valued 
function 𝜔 that assigns numbers of the interval [0,1] to the propositions of the corresponding test 
range. Given an epistemically accessible statistical state, i.e. a probability distribution over the firefly 
box, the atomic propositions a, b, c, d gain the measures of their respective partition cells with 
respect to the original statistical state as probabilities. Thus, 𝜔(𝑆) with S = a, b, c, d provides a largely 
condensed static representation of the picture studied by beim Graben & Atmanspacher (2006, 
2009). For perspective α�, the condition 𝜔(𝑎) + 𝜔(𝑏) + 𝜔(𝑛) = 1 has to be satisfied on one hand, 
and for perspective β� the condition 𝜔(𝑐) + 𝜔(𝑑) + 𝜔(𝑛) = 1, on the other hand. By means of 
continuation, this function becomes an additive probability measure over the proposition lattice 
depicted in Figure 5. The resulting space of probability models is convex, i.e., closed under convex 
combinations.  
Therefore, the probability measure 𝜔 is uniquely determined by three real numbers  
 
𝑥 = 𝜔(𝑎); 𝑦 = 𝜔(𝑐); 𝑧 = 𝜔(𝑛) 
 
as any other value, e.g. 𝜔(𝑏) = 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑧, can be obtained through convexity: 0 ≤ 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ≤ 1, 
𝑥 + 𝑧 ≤ 1, and 𝑦 + 𝑧 ≤ 1.  
                                                          
26 Moreover, beim Graben et al. (2013) coupled two harmonic oscillators together and showed that an 
eigenstate of a global observable could not simultaneously be an eigenstate of a local observable, a 
phenomenon known as entanglement in quantum physics. However, there is one crucial difference between 
complementarity and entanglement between coarse-grained classical dynamical systems and quantum 
systems: classical dynamical systems must be described by statistical states describing mixtures, i.e. states of 
ignorance; while proper quantum systems exhibit these phenomena already for pure states (which are 
individual phase space points for classical systems).  
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On the other hand, in our Hilbert space representation, Figure 6, the measure 𝜔 is given by a 
unit vector 𝑤 = [𝑏,𝑎,𝑛] due to Gleason’s theorem. Both descriptions can be mediated by the 
probability amplitudes 𝑥 = 𝑎2,𝑦 = 𝑐2, 𝑧 = 𝑛2, such that the normalization constraint is identically 
fulfilled through convexity, via 𝑏2 = 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑧. However, for the complete characterization of the 
vector 𝑤 the rotation angle 𝜑 in Figure 6 is required. This obeys the following constraint:27
 
√𝑥 cos 𝜑 − √1 − 𝑥 − 𝑧 sin 𝜑 = �𝑦 . 
  
 
The solution is given as follows:28
 
 
(32)       𝜑 = arccos � 𝑦
1−𝑧
− arcsin �1−𝑥−𝑧
1−𝑧
 
 
The two-dimensional firefly moves continuously along the circle depicted in Figure 7 where it is not 
blinking most of the time. If we assume that blinking requires some amount of time, we can interpret 
𝑥 as the proportion of blinking time in cell 𝑎 and 𝑦 as the proportion of blinking time in cell 𝑐. For the 
stroboscopic sampling with 𝑇𝐵 = 𝑇/2 the firefly only blinks in cell 𝑐 when it is in cell 𝑏 as well. 
Therefore 𝜔(𝑏) = 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑧 = 𝑦 = 𝜔(𝑐) and hence 1 − 𝑧 = 𝑥 + 𝑦. Inserting these numbers into 
equation (32) we obtain  
 
(33)   𝜑 = arccos � 𝑦𝑥+𝑦 − arcsin � 𝑦𝑥+𝑦 = 𝜋2 − 2 arcsin � 𝑦𝑥+𝑦 . 
 
In the special case of uniformly distributed blinking durations 𝑥 = 𝑦 we get 𝜑 = 𝜋
2
− 2 arcsin √0.5 =
𝜋2−2𝜋4= 0.  
As a result, in the static firefly picture when dynamic refinement is not taken into account, the 
perspectives α� and β� are compatible for uniform blinking time distributions. However, the general 
case could be realized when the firefly is attracted and repelled in cells 𝑎 and 𝑏 with different 
probabilities. In the dynamical systems framework this could be described by the presence of saddle 
nodes that are connected via heteroclinic sequences — an approach that has recently become 
increasingly popular in neural modelling (Rabinovich et al. 2008; beim Graben and Hutt 2014). Tuning 
the system’s parameter, e.g. in such a way that 𝑦 = 𝑥(3 − 2√2 ) yields  𝜑 = 𝜋
4
 , i.e. maximal 
incompatibility for the static firefly picture.  
                                                          
27 Proof: Assuming a real Hilbert space ℋ, we identify the coordinates 𝑏 = √1 − 𝑥 − 𝑧 along the b-axis, 
𝑎 = √𝑥 along the a-axis, and 𝑛 = √𝑧 along the n-axis in Figure 6. In the rotated coordinate system we have 
additionally 𝑏 = 𝑑 cos 𝜑 − 𝑐 sin 𝜑 such that 𝑐 = �𝑦 and, because 𝑑 is unknown, 𝑑 = 𝑏 cos 𝜑 + 𝑎 sin 𝜑. 
Eliminating 𝑑 from the first equation by means of the second one, yields after some rearrangements 𝑏 sin 𝜑 =
𝑎 cos 𝜑 − 𝑐, from which the conclusion follows. 
28 Proof: Using complex arithmetic for solving 𝑎 cos 𝜑 − 𝑏 sin 𝜑 = 𝑐 we obtain 𝑎
2
(ei𝜑 + e−i𝜑) − 𝑏
2𝑖
(ei𝜑 −e−i𝜑) = 𝑐 and 1
2
[𝑎ei𝜑 + 𝑎e−i𝜑 + i𝑏ei𝜑 − i𝑏e−i𝜑] = 𝑐. Hence, 1
2
[(𝑎 + i𝑏)ei𝜑 + (𝑎 − i𝑏)e−i𝜑] = 𝑐 . Introducing 
the complex number 𝑞 = 𝑎 + i𝑏 = 𝑟ei𝜃 , with modulus 𝑟 = √𝑎2 + 𝑏2 and angle 𝜃 = arctan ( 𝑏/𝑎), yields 
1
2
�𝑟ei𝜃ei𝜑 + 𝑟e−i𝜃e−i𝜑� = 𝑐. Further, we get 𝑟
2
�ei(𝜃+𝜑) + e−i(𝜃+𝜑)� = 𝑐 and 𝑟 cos ( 𝜃 + 𝜑) = 𝑐. Hence, 𝜑 =arccos �𝑐
𝑟
� − 𝜃 . Inserting 𝑟 and 𝜃 and utilizing another trigonometric identity entails the solution.  
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To summarize, four aspects make symbolic dynamics promising as a unifying framework of 
quantum cognition and neurodynamic systems theory. First, symbolic dynamics through coarse-
graining normally leads to a loss of information. This is advantageous when the obtained abstraction 
captures essential traits of the original dynamics. There are many theoretical instruments to analyse 
symbol sequences, for example formal language theory, making symbolic dynamic especially 
powerful. Second, for many important systems generating partitions exist. In such a case, each point 
of the phase space can be uniquely identified by an infinite sequence of symbols. Studying the 
symbolic dynamics is therefore completely equivalent to studying the original dynamics. In other 
words, symbol-manipulating computations can be completely equivalent to continuous dynamics in 
such systems. In other cases yet where no generating partitions exist, we are confronted with 
complementary descriptions that still allow for a satisfactory symbolic description of the underlying 
continuous dynamics. Third, emergent symbolic dynamics can be stochastic for an underlying 
deterministic system. Important examples are Markov partitions for some chaotic deterministic 
systems that are generating. The resulting symbolic dynamics is a Markov process, which is 
equivalent to a stochastic system of random variables.  Finally, fourth, symbolic dynamics can help to 
find interpretations of parameters that otherwise are left without any plausible interpretation. We 
have illustrated this in length with the hidden parameter 𝜑  (introduced by Gleason’s theorem) and its 
probabilistic interpretation above. 
 
6.3 Bounded rationality and resource limitations 
In Section 6.1, we have considered the general structure of propositions. We have argued that this 
structure conforms to orthomodular lattices. These lattices can be obtained through the union of 
(partial) Boolean lattices (or Boolean blocks) which conform to different perspectives, a cognitive 
agent can assume. According to James (1890), we regard these perspectives in correspondence to 
the different knowledge domains the agent is able to access. In this connection we introduced the 
term “autoepistemic accessibility”. It is of primary interest to ask for the rationale behind the 
existence of different Boolean blocks.  One possible hypothesis is that these blocks result from 
cognitive resource limitations. In the present section, we will check this hypothesis, and we will 
describe some arguments that illustrate how this idea could lead to empirical predictions.  
First, we recognize an overall analogy between decision problems under bounded rationality 
and quantum cognition by comparing the prototypical decision situation depicted in Figure 1 with 
the firefly box from Figure 3. In Figure 1, a cognitive agent has to choose between two prospects a 
and b. Under prospect a, the two payoffs x1(a) and x2(a) are different from the corresponding payoffs 
x1(b) and x2(b), resulting from prospect b. In Figure 3, an observer can choose between two different 
perspectives α�  and β� of the firefly box. Taking perspective α�, the possible outcomes are left view a 
and right view b, that are different from left view c and right view d, seen from perspective β�. 
Because the resources of the agent are limited with respect to observation timing and precision, she 
is unable to maintain both perspectives α� and β� simultaneously – both perspectives lead to different 
partitions of the firefly box. Thus under bounded rationality, perspectives α� and β� are 
complementary when their respective proposition lattices are Boolean blocks of a non-Boolean 
orthomodular (Piron-Solér) lattice comprised by their union. By means of this analogy, the prospects 
a and b of the original decision problem shown in Figure 1 could be complementary as well when the 
united propositional lattice turns out to be orthomodular. In this case, a Hilbert space representation 
could be constructed from which an instance of quantum cognition emerges. The crucial parameters 
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of a quantum cognition model, phase angles and interference terms are entailed from a probability 
model by means of Gleason’s theorem. 
As a decent illustration of quantum cognition as bounded rationality, we discuss the 
phenomenon of speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) as described by Wickelgren (1977). The example we 
will consider here is the paradigmatic letter recognition task of Reed (1973). In Reed’s classical 
experiment, subjects were presented a list of three consonants, e.g. ‘bkr’, they had to read aloud. 
Then a mask of a three-digit number appeared for some time that the subjects had to count down by 
three for 15 seconds. Afterwards, a probe consonant, say, ‘k’, appeared for some period of time that 
the subjects had to retrieve from the priming list. Plotting retrieval accuracy (discriminability d’) 
against total recognition time, exhibits characteristic, so-called SAT curves.  
Up to now, decision times and SAT curves have been very successfully modelled by random walk 
or, in the continuum limit, drift-diffusion models (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993; Ratcliff 1978; 
Ratcliff and Rouder 1998). In order to describe Reed’s findings in a random walk model, one 
introduces a variable for the accumulated preference of a binary decision. Say, ‘k’ was the probe that 
appeared in the last trial of the experiment, the subject has to decide whether ‘k’ had appeared in 
the list ‘bkr’ (YES) or whether it had not (NO). Because the correct response is YES, the amount of 
accumulated preference stochastically drifts towards a certain threshold until hitting either the YES 
or the NO threshold, signalling either a correct or an erroneous decision. 
 
We fit Reed’s (1973) original data to Ratcliff’s (1978) drift-diffusion model in Fig. 9, where 
discriminability d’ depends on time 𝑡 though 
𝑑′ = 𝑑′ASY
�1 + 𝑠2/[𝜂2 (𝑡 − 𝑡0)] 
 
here 𝑑′ASY is the asymptotic discriminability, 𝑠2 is drift variance, 𝜂2 is relatedness variance, and 𝑡0 is 
the origin of the timescale (i.e. intercept).  
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Figure 9. Speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) functions for the letter recognition experiment 
of Reed (1973). Discriminability d’  estimated as complementary equivalent error rate (1-
r) [Reed (1973), Fig. 2]. Two single subjects were investigated (called E.R. and N.V., 
respectively). Upper triangles and solid fit for subject E.R.; lower triangles and dashed fit 
for subject N.V. Error bars indicate one standard error. 
 
The SAT functions in Figure 9 indicate that retrieval accuracy is the larger the more decision time the 
subject has available. In other words, the shorter the decision time the larger the retrieval error, 
which explains the notion speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
Regarding theoretical understanding, Busemeyer and Townsend’s (1993) decision field theory, 
addresses several pertinent problems of classical decision theory related to the simple model from 
Figure 1 and to the assessment of subjective expected utility – see equations (1a,b). One important 
step in this model introduces a random walk dynamics where the agent’s preference towards 
prospect a against prospect b becomes accumulated over some period of time. In this sense, we can 
interpret the temporal accumulation of evidence in decision field theory by means of virtual 
decisions between complementary perspectives in terms of the quantum cognition framework 
presented in Section 6.2. In other words, even before the final decision takes place, the cognitive 
agent has to assess the subjective expected utility of competing prospects from an autoepistemic 
point of view. Under bounded rationality constraints this cannot be achieved simultaneously but 
must be carried out successively, when the agent’s cognitive resources are too much limited. In this 
case, one prospect is autoepistemically not accessible from the chosen perspective of the other 
prospect, and vice versa. Hence the decision problem must be solved by accumulating preference 
through virtual decisions between complementary perspectives. 
Traditionally, the SAT effect is induced by differences in the preparation of the experiment: A 
subject could be instructed either to be as fast or to be as accurate as possible (Wickelgren 1977). In 
the first case, time constraints can be prescribed as in Reed’s (1973) experiment. In the second case, 
accuracy can be controlled by different payoffs. In a random walk model, both kinds of manipulation 
are eventually reflected by the positioning of the first-passage threshold, θ, triggering the decision. If 
θ is large, accuracy is emphasized on the expense of long first-passage times. If, on the other hand, θ 
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is small, first-passage times become small as well on the expense of a large error rate. Figure 10 
illustrates these two possibilities along the lines of Ratcliff & Rouder (1998) and Busemeyer and 
Townsend (1993). Here we simulate a random walk process (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993, Eq. 
(3b)) 
 
?̂?(𝑡) = ?̂?(𝑡 − 1) +  𝑑 +  𝜀̂(𝑡) 
 
where ?̂?(𝑡) is the accumulated preference after sampling time 𝑡, 𝑑 is the drift whose sign indicates 
the direction of the decision dynamics: 𝑑 > 0 for YES and 𝑑 < 0 for NO, and 𝜀̂(𝑡), the residual, is a 
Gaussian random process with zero mean and variance σ2.  
 
 
(a) (b)   
 
Figure 10. Three realizations of a random walk model (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993) 
with positive drift d = 0.05 and residual variance  σ2 = 0.2. (a) Small decision threshold 
|θ| = 1 (dashed lines) yields small first-passage times but error rate = 0.33. (b)  Larger 
threshold |θ| = 2 (dashed lines) yields longer decision times, yet perfect accuracy of 1.0.   
 
Looking at Figure 10 immediately suggests an interpretation of the SAT effect in terms of dynamical 
systems and symbolic dynamics: Accumulated preference ?̂?(𝑡) is a scalar quantity comprising a one-
dimensional phase space (in contrast to the two-dimensional example of the harmonic oscillator 
discussed above). Therefore, the y-axis in Fig. 10 can be interpreted as the system’s phase space 
alone. A partition of the system’s phase space is then any decomposition of the y-axis into disjoint 
intervals. Thus, the decision threshold θ partitions the scale of accumulated preference in three 
intervals. Assigning a symbol “a” to the interval [θ, ∞), “b” to the interval (-θ, θ) and “c” to the 
interval [-∞, -θ) of Fig. 10(a) creates a trinary symbolic dynamics (beim Graben & Kurths 2003) of the 
random walk model by virtue of the encoding rules st = “a” for all times t larger than the first-passage 
time with respect to θ; st = “c” for all times t larger than the first-passage time with respect to -θ; and 
st = “b” for all other times t. Likewise, the different encoding threshold θ of Fig. 10(b), partitions the  
y-axis into cells symbol “d” for the interval [θ, ∞), “e” for the interval (-θ, θ) and “f” for  the  interval 
[-∞, -θ) with encoding rules st = “d” for all times t larger than the first-passage time with respect to θ; 
st = “e” for all times t larger than the first-passage time with respect to -θ; and st = “f” for all other 
times t. The symbolic sequences resulting from these both encoding procedures are eventually 
periodic, thereby indicating bistable attractor dynamics. Yet it has been proven that partitions for 
multistable dynamical systems can never be generating (beim Graben 2004). Therefore, two different 
partitions that are induced by two different decision thresholds θ such as in Figs. 10(a) and (b), 
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respectively, are incompatible to each other in the sense of the epistemic quantization of a classical 
dynamical system (beim Graben & Atmanspacher 2006, 2009). Hence we conclude that the SAT 
effect can be interpreted in terms of that (auto)epistemic quantization being compatible with its 
classical description by random walk processes.29
Summarizing we see that the coarse-grained random walk model of the SAT phenomenon leads 
naturally to an autoepistemic quantization of the agent’s one-dimensional preference dynamics. 
Different experimental instructions of the subject yield different partitions of the subject’s 
autoepistemic states which appear to be complementary since none of them is generating. 
Interpreting the sequences of the resulting symbolic dynamics as propositions, their lattices become 
Boolean blocks of a united orthomodular lattice.  This, we conclude, is the foundation of quantum 
cognition from bounded rationality. 
 
 
7.  Quantum cognition and its formal grounding: some 
tentative conclusions 
In the first part of this article, we have considered several puzzles of bounded rationality, and we 
have shown how the present account of quantum cognition – taking quantum probabilities rather 
than classical probabilities – can give a more systematic clarification of these puzzles than the 
alternate and rather eclectic treatments in the traditional framework of bounded rationality. 
Unfortunately, the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always and does not automatically 
provide a deeper understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. The reason is that the 
quantum idea introduces several new parameters which possibly can be fitted to empirical data but 
which do not necessarily explain them. Hence, the phenomenological research has to be augmented 
by responding to deeper foundational issues. The second part of the paper is devoted to that 
problem.   
The foundational approach to quantum cognition exploits ideas of the operational approach to 
quantum physics which does not take the Hilbert space as a given conceptual framework but rather 
which tries to motivate it. Following the research by Foulis, Randall and colleagues such a 
foundational framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras that describe the 
particular perspectives of a cognitive agent.  These perspectives are combined into a uniform system 
while considering certain capacity restrictions. Technically, this gives an orthomodular-lattice – a 
structure that can violate distributivity. From an empirical perspective, it is at this point that one 
important aspect of the whole idea of bounded rationality directly enters the theoretical scenery of 
quantum cognition: resource limitation. Resource limitation has the effect that not all possible 
perspectives can be simultaneously maintained by a cognitive agent.30
                                                          
29 This interpretation does not exclude another possibility that is currently being investigated by several 
researchers, namely the need of quantum dynamics instead of classical Markov models for the description of 
the time-course of decision making processes (Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend 2006, Busemeyer et al. 2009, 
Busemeyer and Bruza 2012). It might actually be tempting to speculate about the need of a second 
quantization of decision field theory to this end. However, at the present stage it is too early to make any 
definite statements about these recent developments. 
   
30 An interesting question that will arise is the problem of skill acquisition or automatization. The present 
view is compatible with an instance theory of automatization  (Logan 1988) in which automatization is 
construed by the acquisition of separate representational instances. 
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One important issue both in physics and in the new field of quantum cognition concerns the 
notion of compatibility and complementarity. In physics, the complementarity of two observables 
has nothing to do with the incompetence or inability of the observer being able to perform two 
simultaneous measurements. Rather, it has to do with the nature of the measurements per se. We 
have seen already that in the cognitive realm observables correspond to questions that are asked to 
a human subject whose behaviour is investigated. Complementarity can be the result of the inability 
of our human subject to perform simultaneous tasks. In Section 6.3 we have illustrated how this idea 
helps to understand phenomena such as speed-accuracy trade-offs.  
In discussing the Ellsberg puzzle another important aspect of the foundational issue came to 
light. The foundational argument is connected with Gleason’s theorem and automatically leads to a 
distinction between probabilities that are defined by pure states and probabilities arising from the 
statistical mixture of such states. It is possible to relate this formal distinction to the deep conceptual 
distinction between risk and ignorance. 
Curiously enough, there are proponents of cognitive science who set up an opposition between 
computation, conceived in the usual symbol-manipulation sense, and continuous nonlinear dynamics 
(e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988). This seems to us quite misleading, if only because the existence of 
generating partitions shows how symbol-manipulating computation can be completely equivalent to 
a dynamical system. In cases where we do not find generating partitions it still can be possible that 
complementary descriptions exist that give a satisfying symbolic description of the underlying 
continuous nonlinear dynamics. In this sense, the instruments of quantum description help to 
minimize the gap between symbolic descriptions and descriptions in terms of nonlinear differential 
equations as used in neuroscience.  
According to beim Graben (2004), the transient dynamics of a nonlinear system in general and 
of a neural network in particular can be interpreted as computation, i.e. the manipulation of discrete 
symbols, upon a partition of the system’s phase space. The resulting symbolic dynamics belongs to a 
certain complexity class and can be generated by a suitable dynamic automaton (beim Graben 2004). 
So far, partitions have been introduced as voluntary perspectives of an observer. However, they can 
also be created internally, from an autoepistemic point of view, which has been shown in the 
framework of liquid computation (Maass et al. 2002; beim Graben et al. 2009). A liquid computer is a 
large disordered neural network with random connectivity. Only a small sub-network of so-called 
read-out neurons is trained to solve prescribed classification tasks on the high-dimensional phase 
space trajectories, i.e. the read-out neurons partition the remaining phase space. If the read-out 
neurons are trained with more than one classification tasks, the resulting partitions may become 
complementary, hence yielding quantum cognition capabilities of neural networks (Acacio de Barros 
and Suppes 2009). 
In quantum physics, we have an impressive series of crucial experiments that provide prima 
facie evidence for the basic assumption of quantum theory and the failing of classical theories. 
Prominent examples include the photoelectric effect (demonstrating particle properties of light), the 
Compton effect, the Frank-Hertz experiment, double slit experiments with single photons or with 
single electrons and Stern-Gerlach experiment. Textbooks of quantum physics give many other 
examples that provide a direct demonstration of quantum effects. In all these cases, the things speak 
for themselves and there is no need to provide a complicated reasoning process or to provide 
extraneous details, since any reasonable person would immediately find the facts convincingly 
demonstrating the quantum hypothesis.   
Unfortunately, the situation in quantum cognition is much less convincing concerning prima 
facie evidence that proves the need of basic assumptions of quantum cognition. Critical experiments 
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are rare in the field. Perhaps most convincing is what we have considered in Section 4.3 in 
connection with order phenomena, namely Wang’s and Busemeyer’s (2013) demonstration that the 
quantum approach can describe all four types of order effects that were considered in Section 3.4. Of 
special interest is their verification of the ‘law of reciprocity’. In this case, each reasonable person will 
admit that classical probability cannot account for this constraint. Only the formalism of quantum 
theory is able to do so. 
 In the field of cognitive linguistic, the situation is much less clear. Though phenomena such as 
prototypicality, vagueness, polysemy, and invited inferences (Grice 1989) are cases in point to apply 
the formalism of quantum theory (e.g., Blutner 2009), there are only few phenomena that provide a 
rather direct evidence in favour of such a formalism. A potential example is the phenomenon of 
borderline vagueness (Blutner et al. 2013).  
Summarizing, we conclude that the future of quantum cognition depends on the discovery of 
phenomena that provide prima facie evidence for crucial assumptions of quantum cognition. 
Perhaps, cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics are potential areas for corresponding 
discoveries. However, also fields such as music theory – especially mathematical theories of tonal 
music including theories of modulation and emotional meaning could give new impulses (Mazzola 
2002; Tymoczko 2011; Lerdahl 2001). For instance,  structural quantum probabilities – arising from 
the structure of the Hilbert spaces – could be used to model universal traits of cognition that cannot 
be learned but have to be assumed as innate and emerging from an underlying Hebbian  
neurodynamics (Large 2010). The methodological aspects of founding quantum probabilities we have 
discussed in this paper could be a helpful guide on this road.  
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